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INTRODUCTION 
In June of 2005, the Supreme Court issued much-anticipated decisions 
in a pair of cases challenging the posting of the Ten Commandments on 
government property.  A sharply divided Court produced a total of ten dif-
ferent opinions in the two cases, articulating a dizzying array of widely di-
vergent interpretations of the Establishment Clause.  The bottom line was a 
split decision:  in Van Orden v. Perry,1 the Court sanctioned a longstanding 
Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol, 
but in McCreary County v. ACLU,2 the Court refused to countenance two 
recent Ten Commandments displays on the walls of Kentucky county 
courthouses.  The outcomes were ultimately dictated by a single vote—that 
of Justice Breyer, the only Justice to vote with the majority in both cases.   
Justice Breyer wrote separately in Van Orden to explain his thinking.3  
Much attention will surely be paid to Justice Breyer’s enigmatic concur-
 
*  Associate Professor, The George Washington University Law School; J.D., Harvard Law School, 
1996; A.B., Duke University, 1992. 
1  125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005). 
2  125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005). 
3  Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2868 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).  In a nutshell, Justice 
Breyer eschewed reliance on doctrinal tests to resolve difficult Establishment Clause cases, claiming in-
stead that there is “no test-related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment”—that is, judgment de-
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1097670
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rence, both because it represents the current governing rule,4 and because it 
is fascinating (and profoundly unsatisfying) in its own right.5  
Although Justice Breyer’s opinion will likely garner most of the atten-
tion, it is neither the most shocking opinion of the lot, nor the one that, in 
the long run, has the potential to be the most important.  Those distinctions 
belong to the opinion of Justice Scalia, whose dissent in McCreary County 
may represent the beginnings of a revolution in Establishment Clause juris-
prudence—a wholesale rethinking of the constitutional relationship between 
church and state.  According to Justice Scalia’s dissent, Ten Command-
ments monuments are constitutional because the Establishment Clause 
permits the government to favor religion over nonreligion (but not vice 
versa), and, in the context of governmental religious expression, to favor 
Judeo-Christian monotheism over all other religions (but not vice versa).  In 
other words, in Justice Scalia’s opinion, biblical monotheism is now, has 
always been, and will always be, the favored religion of the United States 
Constitution. 
To understand the revolutionary nature of Justice Scalia’s opinion, 
consider three hypothetical cases: 
 
Case 1:  A rural Tennessee town populated primarily by devout Chris-
tians erects a massive Ten Commandments monument in the center of 
the town square with the express purpose of publicly honoring and ex-
pressing a communal belief in the biblical God.  A local Hindu family 
                                                                                                                           
signed to “reflect and remain faithful to the underlying purposes of the Clause[],” with proper considera-
tion of “context and consequences measured in light of those purposes.”  Id. at 2869.  Focusing primar-
ily on the alleged intent of the Framers to avoid religious divisiveness, Justice Breyer distinguished 
between the Texas and Kentucky monuments largely on the grounds that the historical and physical con-
text of the Texas monument indicate that it was intended to, and did, convey a primarily secular mes-
sage, whereas the context surrounding the adoption and display of the Kentucky monuments betrayed 
“the substantially religious objectives of those who mounted them, and the effect of this readily apparent 
objective on those who view them.”  Id. at 2871.  In particular, Justice Breyer focused on the fact that 
the Texas monument had stood for over forty years before it prompted a legal challenge, whereas the 
Kentucky monuments were recently erected in a climate of religious divisiveness.  “[I]n today’s world, 
in a Nation of so many different religious and comparable nonreligious fundamental beliefs, a more con-
temporary state effort to focus attention upon a religious text is certainly likely to prove divisive in a 
way that this longstanding, pre-existing monument has not.”  Id. 
4  “When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the 
assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members 
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’”  Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 
(1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Ste-
vens, JJ.)). 
5  Initial reactions to the Breyer concurrence by legal academics have not been positive.  My col-
league, Ira Lupu, has noted that the opinion’s “Breyerian pragmatism . . . cannot be squared with any 
theory of equal religious liberty in America.”  Posting of Ira Lupu to SCOTUSblog, http://www. 
scotusblog.com/discussion/archives/2005/06/proof_of_secula.html (June 27, 2005, 12:34 EST).  Other 
scholars have been even more harsh.  See, e.g., Posting of Eric Muller to SCOTUSblog, http://www. 
scotusblog.com/discussion/archives/2005/06/justice_breyers.html (June 27, 2005, 14:24 EST) (criticiz-
ing “the foolishness and naïveté of Justice Breyer’s outcome-determinative concurrence”).  
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feels offended and alienated by the monument—especially by its stark 
proclamation, endorsed by the government and carved in stone, that 
“thou shalt have no other gods before me” and that “thou shalt not bow 
down thyself to . . . nor serve” any “graven image”—and immediately 
files a lawsuit seeking to have the monument removed. 
 
Case 2:  A diverse suburb in Silicon Valley, California, with a majority 
population of first- and second-generation Asian immigrants, erects a 
monument on the steps of the town statehouse depicting sculptures of 
Vishnu and Buddha and proclaiming that one must live a good life in 
order to break the cycle of reincarnation and attain enlightenment.  Be-
lieving that this governmentally sanctioned monument contradicts and 
disdains their devoutly held religious beliefs, a local Christian family 
quickly files suit seeking to have the monument removed. 
 
Case 3:  A university town in Wisconsin erects a stone monument in 
the county courthouse that boldly proclaims:  “There is No God.  All 
Laws Come from Mankind Alone.”  A local Catholic family takes 
great offense and immediately files suit, seeking the monument’s re-
moval.   
 
Under the Court’s traditional Establishment Clause jurisprudence, 
these would all be easy cases.  All three monuments would violate the core 
constitutional mandate of government neutrality in religious matters.  The 
Court has determined the central meaning of the Establishment Clause to be 
that  
[g]overnment in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in matters 
of religious theory, doctrine, and practice.  It may not be hostile to any religion 
or to the advocacy of no-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one re-
ligion or religious theory against another or even against the militant opposite.  
The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and 
religion, and between religion and nonreligion.6 
Each of my hypothetical monuments runs afoul of this principle:  the first 
promotes traditional Western religions; the second promotes certain tradi-
tional Eastern religions; and the third promotes nonreligion.  The govern-
ment can do none of those things. 
A narrow majority of the Court still adheres to this view.  This was the 
explicit ground for the majority’s decision to order the removal of Ken-
tucky’s Ten Commandments monuments in McCreary County.  Justice 
Souter, speaking for a majority of the Court that included Justices Stevens, 
O’Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, reiterated that the requirement of neutral-
ity among religions and between religion and nonreligion is “the touch-
 
6  Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1968).  
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stone” of the Establishment Clause inquiry.7  Thus, the government may not 
take action that has the purpose or effect of inhibiting or advancing a par-
ticular religion or set of religions, or religion generally.8  “When the gov-
ernment acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing 
religion,” explained Justice Souter, “it violates that central Establishment 
Clause value of official religious neutrality, there being no neutrality when 
the government’s ostensible object is to take sides.”9  Such was the case 
with the Kentucky monuments.  The monuments were not, on their face, 
neutral.  Rather, “[t]hey proclaim[ed] the existence of a monotheistic god 
(no other gods).  They regulate[d] details of religious observation (no 
graven images, no sabbath breaking, no vain oath swearing).  And they un-
mistakably rest[ed] even the universally accepted prohibitions (as against 
murder, theft, and the like) on the sanction of the divinity . . . .”10  They 
were erected for the impermissible purpose of promulgating and celebrating 
a particular religious message.11  As such, they were not neutral and could 
not withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
Even the Court’s more conservative Justices, who would allow the 
government greater leeway in religious expression and symbolism cases 
than would the Court’s recent majority, have traditionally embraced an un-
derstanding of the Establishment Clause pursuant to which all of my hypo-
 
7  McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2733. 
8  See id. at 2732–33. 
9  Id. at 2733 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 2747 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring); Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2875–76 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The Court’s 
“‘purpose’ requirement aims at preventing the relevant governmental decisionmaker . . . from abandon-
ing neutrality and acting with the intent of promoting a particular point of view in religious matters.”  
Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987). 
10  McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2738.  The text of the monuments read: 
Thou shalt have no other gods before me.  
Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven 
above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water underneath the earth:  Thou shalt not 
bow down thyself to them, nor serve them:  for I the LORD thy God am a jealous God, visiting the 
iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me.  
Thou shalt not take the name of the LORD thy God in vain:  for the LORD will not hold him guilt-
less that taketh his name in vain.  
Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy.  
Honour thy father and thy mother:  that thy days may be long upon the land which the LORD thy 
God giveth thee.  
Thou shalt not kill.  
Thou shalt not commit adultery.  
Thou shalt not steal.  
Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour.  
Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour’s house, thou shalt not covet th[y] neighbor’s wife, nor his 
manservant, nor his maidservant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor anything that is th[y] neighbour’s. 
Id. at 2730–31. 
11  See id. at 2737–41. 
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thetical monuments would be unconstitutional.  They, too, have accepted 
the neutrality mandate, though they have argued that “requiring government 
to avoid any action that acknowledges or aids religion . . . [cannot] in fair-
ness be viewed as serving the goal of neutrality.”12  They view the neutrality 
mandate as a more flexible one, “permit[ting] government some latitude in 
recognizing and accommodating the central role religion plays in our soci-
ety.”13  Still, they have long adhered to the view that the government may 
employ monuments and symbols only if they further secular purposes; gov-
ernment may not act “to proselytize on behalf of a particular religion” or re-
ligions or nonreligion, as each of my hypothetical monuments surely does.14 
Until now, only Justice Thomas had disagreed.15  In recent years, he 
has suggested that the Establishment Clause (and its requirement of neutral-
ity) does not apply to the states at all, and therefore, the states are free to fa-
vor particular religions as they please, so long as they do not run afoul of 
the Free Exercise Clause.16  He has also suggested, as an alternative argu-
ment, that even if the Establishment Clause applies to the states, it prevents 
only the legal coercion of religious practices; it does not prohibit the gov-
ernment from expressing a preference for, or a belief in, a particular religion 
or nonreligion.17  On either of those readings, the aforementioned hypotheti-
cal cases are still easy ones; they just come out the other way.  None of the 
monuments violates the Establishment Clause, either because that clause 
does not bind state or local governments, or because it reaches only overtly 
coercive government action. 
 
12  County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657–58 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice 
Scalia). 
13  Id. at 657. 
14  Id. at 661; see also id. at 660 (arguing that the Establishment Clause precludes “governmental ex-
hortation to religiosity that amounts in fact to proselytizing”).  Thus, Justice Kennedy has conceded that 
the Establishment Clause “forbids a city to permit the permanent erection of a large Latin cross on the 
roof of city hall.”  Id. at 661.  Of course, the Court’s more conservative Justices, including Justice Ken-
nedy, have voted to uphold government displays of religious symbols like the Ten Commandments, 
but—with the exception of Justice Scalia’s opinion in McCreary County—they have done so only on the 
grounds that the particular monument at issue does not, in their opinion, seek to proselytize or advance 
religion, but rather seeks only to recognize our nation’s religious heritage.  See, e.g., id. at 663–67 (rely-
ing on Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)); id. at 678–79; Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2861–64 
(Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion).  The Ten Commandments monument in my hypothetical Case 1, by 
contrast, was erected for the purpose of honoring and worshiping God. 
15  The only other partial modern exception to the neutrality rule was then-Justice Rehnquist’s solo 
dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91–111 (1985), in which he argued that the government could 
prefer religion over nonreligion, but conceded that it could not prefer one religion or group of religions 
over another.  Rehnquist did not mention this theory again after his Jaffree dissent, and he appeared (at 
least prior to joining Justice Scalia in McCreary County) to have abandoned it.  See Michael W. 
McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 145 (1992).   
16  See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49–51 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in the judgment). 
17  See id. at 2331–33; Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2865 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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Thus, until the Spring of 2005, the one thing that all of the Justices 
could seemingly agree upon was that, whatever the proper legal rule, all 
three of my hypothetical cases must come out the same way.  Either gov-
ernment neutrality is required, in which case all three monuments are un-
constitutional, or government neutrality is not required, in which case the 
courts must defer to democratic majorities and all three monuments are 
constitutional.  Either way, the proper resolution of the Establishment 
Clause question does not turn on which religion (or lack thereof) the gov-
ernment chooses to endorse; all religions are entitled to equal status under 
the Constitution.  That much, at least, seemed to be beyond serious dispute. 
Not anymore.  Justice Scalia’s dissent in McCreary County has upset 
that long-settled consensus.  Relying primarily on history, Justice Scalia, 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, has staked out a po-
sition pursuant to which the first of my hypothetical monuments (the one 
advancing Western religions) would be constitutional, whereas the other 
two monuments (the ones advancing Eastern religions and atheism) would 
be unconstitutional.  In other words, the outcome depends upon which relig-
ion the government is supporting.  The Establishment Clause affords greater 
protection to the believers of some religions (Christianity, Judaism, Islam) 
than others (Hinduism, Buddhism, no religion, everything else).  Turning 
traditional constitutional law on its head, Justice Scalia’s approach treats the 
Establishment Clause in the context of governmental religious expression 
neither as a mandate for equality, nor as a vehicle for protection of the mi-
nority against the tyranny of the majority, but rather as a mechanism for 
protecting the majority and the majority alone.  And not just that:  it appears 
that, according to Justice Scalia’s view, the Establishment Clause affords 
greater protection only to the majority religious outlook (Judeo-
Christianity) that was prevalent at the time of the framing.  If ever the tables 
are turned, and the practitioners of other religions (or of no religion) 
achieve majority status in some communities (as imagined in my hypotheti-
cal Cases 2 and 3), the Establishment Clause will not extend the same rights 
and powers to them that it extends to adherents of Judeo-Christianity.  To 
Justice Scalia, biblical monotheism is and always shall be the preferred re-
ligion of the American Constitution.   
The importance of Justice Scalia’s revolutionary opinion should not be 
underestimated.  While Justice Breyer wrote his controlling opinion only 
for himself (and it is difficult to imagine other Justices joining in his largely 
idiosyncratic views), Justice Scalia secured the votes of two other Justices, 
with perhaps more votes to come as the Court undergoes its first personnel 
changes in more than a decade.  With Justice O’Connor (one of the Justices 
in the five-to-four majority in McCreary County) already retired, Justice 
Stevens (another member of the McCreary County majority) recently cele-
brating his eighty-sixth birthday, and President Bush having declared his in-
100:1097  (2006) A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? 
 1103
tention to appoint Justices in the mold of Justices Scalia and Thomas,18 Jus-
tice Scalia’s view may well command a majority of the Court in the very 
near future.19  As such, his opinion demands particularly close scrutiny.  
This Article represents a first look at, and an initial criticism of, his 
reasoning.  Part I examines Justice Scalia’s dissent in some detail, attempt-
ing to ascertain its meaning and implications.  Part II critiques the dissent 
on three principal grounds.  First, in Part II.A, I argue that Justice Scalia’s 
reasoning is based on a misguided conception of inclusiveness and of mi-
nority rights, wrongly suggesting that an equality norm that protects ap-
proximately eighty-five percent of Americans, at the expense of the other 
fifteen percent, is somehow constitutionally acceptable.  Second, in Part 
II.B, I argue that Justice Scalia’s defense of his rule on the ground of a per-
ceived need for doctrinal consistency rings hollow, both because his own 
rule manifestly does not achieve the consistency that he seeks, and because 
it is misguided to insist, in the name of consistency, that the Court’s tradi-
tional neutrality mandate is somehow “discredited” by the Court’s prag-
matic refusal to immediately extend it to the full extent of its logical reach.  
Finally, in Part II.C, I take issue with Justice Scalia’s use of history.  I argue 
that Justice Scalia’s rule cannot be defended on originalist grounds because, 
although it aligns almost perfectly with the political preferences of the Re-
publican Party, it is both theoretically bankrupt and demonstrably not man-
dated by, nor even supported by, the historical evidence of the original 
meaning of the First Amendment on which it is purportedly based.  In that 
respect, Justice Scalia’s dissent stands as a stark example of the inability of 
originalism to produce in practice—even when practiced by its most able 
disciples—a genuine apolitical constitutionalism.   
I. THE MEANING OF JUSTICE SCALIA’S DISSENT:  
CONSTITUTIONALLY PREFERRED RELIGIONS 
Justice Scalia’s dissent is set out in three parts.  Parts II and III are 
comparatively less interesting, as they are dedicated to the proposition that, 
even if one accepts the Court’s existing body of Establishment Clause juris-
prudence—including the neutrality mandate—the Kentucky counties’ Ten 
Commandments monuments are still constitutional.20  Justice Scalia argues 
that, in context, it is clear that the counties displayed the Commandments 
“not to teach their binding nature as a religious text, but to show their 
 
18  See Todd S. Purdum, Court in Transition:  The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2005, at A1.   
19  President Bush’s first successful Supreme Court appointment, Chief Justice Roberts, replaced one 
of the Justices who joined Justice Scalia’s dissent:  Chief Justice Rehnquist.  As such, that appointment 
cannot have brought Justice Scalia’s view any closer to achieving majority status.  President Bush’s sec-
ond appointment—of Justice Alito to replace Justice O’Connor—may well tell a different story, though 
it is too early to know for sure.  If President Bush were able to make a third appointment, that appoint-
ment could potentially provide a fifth vote for Justice Scalia’s position. 
20  See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2757–64 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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unique contribution to the development of the legal system.”21  Accordingly, 
their display does not materially advance or favor religion, nor was it in-
tended to do so.22   
 
21  Id. at 2759. 
22  This argument is, frankly, hard to swallow.  Even if, Justice Souter’s compelling evidence to the 
contrary notwithstanding, Justice Scalia were correct about the legislative purpose—that the Kentucky 
counties erected the Ten Commandments monuments as nothing more than “a symbol of the role that 
religion played, and continues to play, in our system of government,” id. at 2760—why should that mat-
ter?  What purpose, other than the advancement or promotion of religion, is served by emphasizing the 
alleged religious foundations of our law and government?  One could argue that there is a legitimate, 
secular legislative purpose in ensuring historical accuracy—in avoiding what Justice Scalia terms “a re-
visionist agenda of secularization” that rewrites American history to whitewash it of all religious influ-
ence.  Id. at 2763.  But that argument is, in this context, fatally undercut by American history itself.  The 
Kentucky counties included in their displays a declaration that “the Ten Commandments have pro-
foundly influenced the formation of . . . our country” and “provide the moral background of the Declara-
tion of Independence.”  See id. at 2731 (majority opinion).  But, as Justice Souter correctly noted, the 
Ten Commandments are the quintessential expression of the notion that law comes from God, whereas 
the Declaration of Independence is the best known expression of the profoundly different—and at the 
time, revolutionary—notion that the legitimacy of law and government comes not from above, but rather 
“from the consent of the governed.”  Id. at 2740–41; see also Paul Finkelman, The Ten Commandments 
on the Courthouse Lawn and Elsewhere, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1477, 1510 (2005).  Indeed, the entire 
American system of government was a direct product of the Enlightenment, a philosophical movement 
characterized by an emphasis on reason rather than faith.  See, e.g., Charles Fried, Philosophy Matters, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 1739, 1742 (1998).  Many of the most important players in the drafting of the Decla-
ration and the Constitution and in the framing of our nation were Deists, whose Enlightenment-inspired 
religious beliefs often rejected the God of the Bible and of the Ten Commandments altogether.  See 
FRANK LAMBERT, THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN AMERICA 160–61, 178 
(2003); infra Part II.C.  In historian Frank Lambert’s words,  
[t]he significance of the Enlightenment and Deism for the birth of the American republic, and es-
pecially the relationship between church and state within it, can hardly be overstated.  In brief, the 
United States was conceived not in an Age of Faith such as that of the Puritan Fathers but in an 
Age of Reason . . . .  The Founders thought that people should be free to seek religious truth 
guided only by reason and the dictates of their consciences, and they determined that a secular 
state, supporting no religion but protecting all, best served that end. 
Id. at 161–62.  See generally Finkelman, supra, at 1500–16; Steven K. Greene, The Fount of Everything 
Just and Right?:  The Ten Commandments as a Source of American Law, 14 J.L. & RELIGION 525 
(2000).   
By the same token, in McCreary County, the claim posted next to the Kentucky monuments that the 
Ten Commandments are “codified in Kentucky’s civil and criminal laws,” McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. 
at 2729 (internal quotations omitted), is simply false.  The Ten Commandments manifestly are not codi-
fied in American law, and many of them—such as those prohibiting the worship of other gods and the 
making and serving of graven images—could not possibly be enforced without making a mockery of the 
First Amendment.  See Finkelman, supra, at 1518–19; Marci Hamilton, The Ten Commandments and 
American Law:  Why Some Christians’ Claims to Legal Hegemony Are Not Consistent with the Histori-
cal Record, FINDLAW, Sept. 11, 2003, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20030911.html.  Only two 
of the Ten Commandments—the prohibitions against killing and stealing—are actually codified in cur-
rent law (though with exceptions and defenses not reflected in the biblical text).  And, of course, far 
from being the unique province of the Bible, those prohibitions are universal.  Literally every civilized 
society on Earth prohibits murder and theft, regardless of whether it embraces or traces its legal and cul-
tural roots to the Ten Commandments.  See Harold J. Berman, Law and Logos, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 143, 
159 (1994); Hamilton, supra. 
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In this argument, Justice Scalia was joined not only by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, but also by Justice Kennedy, which is not 
surprising, as Justice Scalia’s discussion here does little more than recount 
the standard conservative line in religious symbolism cases, to which Jus-
tice Kennedy has long adhered.23 
But Justice Scalia offered Parts II and III of his dissent only as an al-
ternative argument for sustaining the constitutionality of the Ten Com-
mandments monuments.  His primary argument is contained in Part I, 
which lost the support of Justice Kennedy but held on to the votes of Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas.  Part I is anything but a rehashing of 
the standard conservative mantra.  It is, instead, an all-out assault on the 
venerable principle of neutrality, the constitutional foundation upon which 
both liberals and conservatives alike had stood steadfast for generations.  It 
proceeds in two phases:  first, as a rejection of the notion that the govern-
ment must remain neutral as between religion and nonreligion; and second, 
as a rejection of the notion that, when it comes to religious symbolism and 
governmental expression of religious beliefs, the government must remain 
neutral as between different religions. 
Justice Scalia begins this assault by canvassing the early history of the 
Republic, noting many instances in which governmental actors invoked re-
ligion, from George Washington’s adding the words “so help me God” to 
the Presidential oath, to the First Congress’s practice of opening legislative 
sessions with a prayer, to the early Presidents’ Thanksgiving Proclama-
tions.24  Justice Scalia questions how, in light of this history, the Court can 
possibly conclude that the Establishment Clause mandates neutrality be-
tween religion and nonreligion and forbids the government from manifest-
ing a purpose to favor religion generally: 
                                                                                                                           
Accordingly, if there is any “revisionist agenda”—to use Justice Scalia’s phrase—at work here, it 
would seem to be in service of vastly overstating the role of religion and of the Ten Commandments in 
the founding of our nation and our legal system.  As such, it is difficult to give credence to the argument 
that there was any legitimate motivation for these monuments other than the advancement of religion. 
23  See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2858–64 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opin-
ion) (arguing that the Texas Ten Commandments monument is constitutional because it simply ac-
knowledges the role played by the Ten Commandments in our nation’s heritage); County of Allegheny 
v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655–79 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting 
in part) (arguing that the display of a creche in a county courthouse was constitutional because it simply 
recognized the role that religion plays in our history and society, and did not seek to endorse or prosely-
tize on behalf of a particular religion); see also City of Elkhart v. Books, 532 U.S. 1058, 1059–63 (2001) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (arguing that monuments depicting the Ten 
Commandments are constitutional because the Ten Commandments have a secular significance as a ma-
jor contributor to our legal codes); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding public display of 
a nativity scene on the ground that the government had a secular purpose for erecting the display—
depicting the historical origins of the Christmas holiday—and that the display did not materially advance 
religion).   
24  See McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2748–50 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Who says so?  Surely not the words of the Constitution.  Surely not the history 
and traditions that reflect our society’s constant understanding of those words.  
Surely not even the current sense of our society, recently reflected in an Act of 
Congress adopted unanimously by the Senate and with only 5 nays in the 
House of Representatives, criticizing a Court of Appeals opinion that had held 
“under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance unconstitutional.25 
Rather, says Justice Scalia, the mandate for governmental neutrality be-
tween religion and nonreligion is the product of nothing more than “the 
Court’s own say-so.”26 
Turning to the principle of neutrality between religions, Justice Scalia 
declares, “[t]hat is indeed a valid principle where public aid or assistance to 
religion is concerned, or where the free exercise of religion is at issue, but it 
necessarily applies in a more limited sense to public acknowledgment of the 
Creator.”27  This is so because: 
[i]f religion in the public forum had to be entirely nondenominational, there 
could be no religion in the public forum at all.  One cannot say the word 
“God,”or “the Almighty,” one cannot offer public supplication or thanksgiv-
ing, without contradicting the beliefs of some people that there are many gods, 
or that God or the gods pay no attention to human affairs.28   
In light of the long historical pedigree of official acknowledgment of God, 
that cannot, says Justice Scalia, be the law.  Rather, “[w]ith respect to pub-
lic acknowledgment of religious belief,” the Constitution permits the gov-
ernment to favor Judeo-Christian monotheism; “it is entirely clear from our 
Nation’s historical practices that the Establishment Clause permits this dis-
regard of polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it permits 
the disregard of devout atheists.”29 
In a footnote, Justice Scalia goes on to add: 
This is not to say that a display of the Ten Commandments could never consti-
tute an impermissible endorsement of a particular religious view.  The Estab-
lishment Clause would prohibit, for example, governmental endorsement of a 
particular version of the Decalogue as authoritative.  Here the display of the 
Ten Commandments alongside eight secular documents, and the plaque’s ex-
planation for their inclusion, make clear that they were not posted to take sides 
in a theological dispute.30 
At first blush, this passage might be taken to suggest that official religious 
expression—even in support of monotheism—violates the Establishment 
Clause unless it is intended to convey a secular, rather than a religious, 
 
25  Id. at 2750 (citations omitted). 
26  Id. 
27  Id. at 2752. 
28  Id. at 2752–53. 
29  Id. at 2753. 
30  Id. at 2753 n.4. 
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message.  One might also get that impression from the brief summary of his 
position that Justice Scalia offered in Van Orden, the Texas Ten Com-
mandments case decided on the same day.  In that case, after joining Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion upholding the Texas monument on the 
ground that it conveyed a secular message, Justice Scalia added a separate 
concurrence referencing his McCreary County dissent: 
I would prefer to reach the same result by adopting an Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence that is in accord with our Nation’s past and present practices, 
and that can be consistently applied—the central relevant feature of which is 
that there is nothing unconstitutional in a State’s favoring religion generally, 
honoring God through public prayer and acknowledgment, or, in a nonprosely-
tizing manner, venerating the Ten Commandments.31 
This apparent proscription against proselytizing might again suggest that 
governmental acknowledgments of the divine are unconstitutional unless 
they are motivated by secular concerns and convey a secular message.  
But that is clearly not what Justice Scalia means to say, as he makes 
perfectly clear when he declares that “even an exclusive purpose to foster or 
assist religious practice is not necessarily invalidating.”32  An exclusive 
purpose to foster religious practice is, of course, a nonsecular purpose, and 
actions such as honoring God through official prayer and divine acknowl-
edgment, when motivated by that purpose, are a form of proselytization, yet 
Justice Scalia is willing to tolerate them.  Indeed, at oral argument in Van 
Orden, Justice Scalia left no room for doubt that he believes that Ten Com-
mandments monuments are constitutional despite the fact that they convey 
a religious, rather than a secular, message: 
It’s not a secular message.  I mean, if you’re watering it down to say that the 
only reason it’s okay is it sends nothing but a secular message, I can’t agree 
with you.  I think the message [that the Ten Commandments monument] sends 
is that law is—and our institutions come from God.  And if you don’t think it 
conveys that message, I just think you’re kidding yourself.33   
What Justice Scalia appears instead to be saying is that the government 
is free to endorse Judeo-Christian monotheism, so long as it does not en-
dorse any particular sect or belief within that broad tent.  Endorsing “God” 
is permissible, but endorsing “Jesus Christ” is not, as the latter endorsement 
takes sides in a theological dispute about the true nature of the monotheistic 
God.34  In other words, the government can proselytize in the sense of en-
 
31  Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2864 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
32  McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2758 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
33  Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (No. 03-1500), available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/03-1500.pdf (question from Jus-
tice Scalia); see also id. at 16 (acknowledging that a Ten Commandments monument conveys “a pro-
found religious message,” rather than a secular one). 
34  See also McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2753 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Publicly honoring the Ten 
Commandments is thus indistinguishable, insofar as discriminating against other religions is concerned, 
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couraging and endorsing Western monotheism generally, but it may not en-
courage or endorse one form of Judeo-Christian monotheism over another.35 
That conclusion is, according to Justice Scalia, mandated by American 
history: “All of the actions of Washington and the First Congress upon 
which I have relied, virtually all Thanksgiving Proclamations throughout 
our history, and all the other examples of our Government’s favoring relig-
ion that I have cited, have invoked God, but not Jesus Christ.”36  From this 
near-unanimity of historical sources, Justice Scalia argues, one can discern 
an original understanding that the Constitution permits broad, nonsectarian 
invocations of God, but does not permit narrow endorsements of particular, 
disputed monotheistic beliefs.37 
                                                                                                                           
from publicly honoring God.  Both practices are recognized across such a broad and diverse range of the 
population—from Christians to Muslims—that they cannot be reasonably understood as a government 
endorsement of a particular religious viewpoint.”); id. (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), 
for the proposition that legislative prayer “in the Judeo-Christian tradition” is constitutional so long is it 
does not “proselytize or advance any one . . . faith or belief”). 
35  One wonders how, if this is indeed the rule, a Ten Commandments monument could possibly be 
constitutional, given that there are a number of different versions of the Decalogue, each endorsed by 
different religious sects, and the differences between the versions reflect deep doctrinal disputes.  See 
Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2879–80 & nn.15–16 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting important distinctions 
between Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish versions of the Ten Commandments).  A governmental Ten 
Commandments monument that includes text must necessarily choose one version over the others, thus 
endorsing one religious interpretation over the others.  Justice Scalia glosses over this problem in a foot-
note by proclaiming, based only on his own personal knowledge and experience, that most religious ad-
herents would not recognize this problem.  See McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2762 n.12 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
36  McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2755 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
37  This conclusion did not come entirely out of the blue.  Justice Scalia had been hinting at, and per-
haps building toward, it for some time.  He had previously expressed concern with the Court’s mandate 
that the government may not prefer religion over nonreligion.  See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 
638 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting “the government’s interest in fostering respect for religion 
generally”); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 29–30 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing 
the Court’s “bold but unsupportable assertion (given such realities as the text of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, the national Thanksgiving Day proclaimed by every President since Lincoln, the inscriptions 
on our coins, the words of our Pledge of Allegiance, the invocation with which sessions of our Court are 
opened and, come to think of it, the discriminatory protection of freedom of religion in the Constitution) 
that government may not ‘convey a message of endorsement of religion’”).  In particular, he had long 
been a champion of the notion that the government may affirmatively “accommodate” religion, even 
when the Free Exercise Clause does not demand it, without running afoul of the Establishment Clause.  
See Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 743–45 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Texas Monthly, 489 
U.S. at 38–40 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 615–18, 635 (1987) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting).  But prior to McCreary County he had always attempted to square that notion with the 
neutrality mandate.  See Grumet, 512 U.S. at 741 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the “neutrality 
demanded by the religion clauses”); id. at 743 (viewing legislative accommodation of religion as “‘a be-
nevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without inter-
ference’” (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970))); Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 34 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (advocating a “distinction between an unlawful attempt to favor religion” and a 
lawful “attempt to guard against the latent dangers of government hostility to religion”); id. at 40 (argu-
ing that legislative accommodations of religion must maintain “the necessary neutrality” and secular 
purpose, and conceding that the Constitution will not tolerate it “when accommodation slides over into 
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But what about official invocations of atheism, nontheistic religion, 
non-Judeo-Christian monotheism, or polytheism?  What if the Judeo-
Christians find themselves in the minority in a particular community, and 
the new atheistic or polytheistic majority chooses to officially acknowledge 
its preferred beliefs?  Does the Constitution permit that?  Justice Scalia does 
not directly confront this question, but he leaves little doubt that his answer 
is no.  He is not endorsing a principle that, when it comes to governmental 
invocations of religion, majority (or even super-majority) rules.  If that were 
his position, then he would have permitted, rather than precluded, sectarian, 
Christian monuments.  He is instead endorsing a narrow, historically based 
exception to the principle of neutrality between religions that applies only 
to the types of generic Judeo-Christian governmental statements and en-
dorsements that were prevalent around the time of the framing.38 
This much is clear from the language of his dissent.  He concludes that 
the historical record demonstrates only that “the Establishment Clause per-
mits th[e] disregard of polytheists[,] . . . believers in unconcerned deities, 
[and] . . . devout atheists.”39  His choice of words here (and throughout his 
dissent) is important.  He does not say that the Constitution permits the dis-
                                                                                                                           
promotion, and neutrality into favoritism”); Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 616 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accepting 
the mandate “that governmental ‘neutrality’ toward religion is the preeminent goal of the First Amend-
ment”); id. at 618 (noting that accommodation may not “devolve into ‘an unlawful fostering of relig-
ion’”). 
Similarly, Justice Scalia had previously hinted that he views government endorsement of nonsectar-
ian monotheism (but not Christianity) as constitutionally permissible.  See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 641 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (declaring “that our constitutional tradition, from the Declaration of Independence 
and the first inaugural address of Washington . . . has, with a few aberrations, ruled out of order gov-
ernment-sponsored endorsement of religion . . . where the endorsement is sectarian, in the sense of 
specifying details upon which men and women who believe in a benevolent, omnipotent Creator and 
Ruler of the world are known to differ (for example, the divinity of Christ)”); Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment at 12, Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (No. 90-1014) (question from Justice Scalia) (“You 
cite Thanksgiving proclamations, you cite the God save the United States.  I mean we don’t say Jesus 
Christ save the United States and this Honorable Court.  And I don’t think that would be in accord with 
our religious freedom tradition—or, In Jesus Christ We Trust on the coins.  We wouldn’t put that in 
there, would we?”); Ira C. Lupu, To Control Faction and Protect Liberty:  A General Theory of the Re-
ligion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 357, 363 (1996) (noting that, at oral argument in Lee v. Weis-
man, Justice Scalia expressed skepticism that the Constitution would permit the use of the phrase “In 
Jesus Christ We Trust,” rather than “In God We Trust,” on our coins).  But despite these hints, prior to 
McCreary County, Justice Scalia had never explicitly stated that the government may depart from the 
principle of neutrality between religions in order to endorse biblical monotheism.  To the contrary, he 
had categorically insisted:  “I have always believed, and all my opinions are consistent with the view, 
that the Establishment Clause prohibits the favoring of one religion over others.”  Grumet, 512 U.S. at 
748 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
38  Justice Scalia has long advocated the notion that “the meaning of the [Establishment] Clause is to 
be determined by reference to historical practices and understandings,” and therefore that practices that 
were common in the early years of the Republic must necessarily be constitutional.  Weisman, 505 U.S. 
at 631–36 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Grumet, 512 U.S. at 751 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The foremost principle I would apply is fidelity to the longstanding traditions of 
our people . . . .”). 
39  McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2753 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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regard of religious minorities (after all, it does not, in his opinion, permit 
the disregard of Jews and Muslims); he says that the Constitution permits 
the disregard of the adherents of certain, specified species of faith (or lack 
thereof):  polytheists, believers in unconcerned deities, and atheists.  He 
forthrightly concedes that, although these persons “are entirely protected by 
the Free Exercise Clause, and by those aspects of the Establishment Clause 
that do not relate to government acknowledgment of the Creator,” they are 
not protected by the aspects of the Establishment Clause that relate to gov-
ernmental acknowledgment of God.40  It is the substance of their religious 
beliefs, not their minority status, that disqualifies them from protection.  
Historically, persons holding these beliefs have been disregarded by the 
government; as such, the government can continue to disregard them today.  
Since there is no comparable historical record of official governmental in-
vocations of atheism or polytheism, the Constitution would not permit the 
disregard of believers in monotheism.41 
Justice Scalia goes on to say that “governmental invocation of God is 
not an establishment.”42  Here again, his words are instructive.  He does not 
make the broad and neutral claim that the Establishment Clause tolerates all 
governmental proclamations about the existence of a god or gods or the 
lack thereof (after all, it does not, in his opinion, tolerate invocations of 
Christ).  Rather, he makes the narrow and one-sided claim that “govern-
mental invocation of God is not an establishment.”43  In other words, the ex-
ception to the requirement of governmental neutrality between religions 
applies only to “public acknowledgment of the Creator”—not to all public 
expression of community sentiments regarding the existence or nonexis-
tence of one or more gods.44  Governmental invocation of God is not an es-
tablishment, but governmental rejection of God, or governmental 
invocation of Zeus or Vishnu or of polytheism generally is an establish-
 
40  Id. at 2756. 
41  Admittedly, there are passages in Justice Scalia’s dissent that focus on the fact that polytheists 
and atheists are in the minority—thus perhaps suggesting that the law would treat them differently if 
their ranks were to swell.  See, e.g., id. at 2753.  Most notably, Justice Scalia explains that “in the con-
text of public acknowledgments of God,” the “interest of th[e] minority in not feeling ‘excluded’” must 
yield to “the interest of the overwhelming majority of religious believers in being able to give God 
thanks and supplication as a people” because “[o]ur national tradition has resolved that conflict in favor 
of the majority.”  Id.  But even here, Justice Scalia emphasizes the national history of invoking the bibli-
cal God, rather than a national history of majority rule. 
42  Id.  See also id. at 2753 (“Historical practices thus demonstrate that there is a distance between 
the acknowledgment of a single Creator and the establishment of a religion.”). 
43  See also id. at 2750 (rejecting “the Courts’ assertion that governmental affirmation of the soci-
ety’s belief in God is unconstitutional”). 
44  Id. at 2752.  For another example of his conspicuously one-sided language, note that Justice 
Scalia rejects “the demonstrably false principle that the government cannot favor religion over irreli-
gion,” id., notwithstanding the fact that the majority had articulated that principle to apply even-
handedly:  “the touchstone for our analysis is the principle that the First Amendment mandates govern-
mental neutrality between . . . religion and nonreligion,” id. at 2733 (majority opinion). 
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ment, as it—just like governmental invocation of Christ—cannot claim the 
sanction of two centuries of historical acquiescence. 
Thus, returning to the hypothetical cases proposed at the outset of this 
Article, on Justice Scalia’s view, we can expect divergent results.  The first 
monument—a Ten Commandments display erected for the declared pur-
pose of publicly honoring and expressing a communal belief in the biblical 
God—would be constitutional, so long as it did not endorse any particular 
Judeo-Christian sect.  That a local Hindu family might feel alienated by the 
monument is of no matter, for “the Establishment Clause permits this disre-
gard of polytheists.”45   
The second monument—depicting sculptures of Vishnu and Buddha, 
and proclaiming that one must live a good life in order to break the cycle of 
reincarnation and attain enlightenment—and the third monument—
proclaiming: “There is No God.  All Laws Come from Mankind Alone”—
would meet with a different result.  Neither of these monuments prosely-
tizes for a particular faith.  The third monument declares a government en-
dorsement of nonreligion.  The second monument depicts figures from two 
different faiths (Hinduism and Buddhism) and offers a general statement 
about the path to enlightenment that might appeal to the practitioners of a 
number of Eastern religions, including Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and 
Sikhism.46  In that sense, it is not unlike the Ten Commandments monu-
ments:  inclusive of the beliefs of a majority of the local population, but of-
fensive and alienating to a minority.  But when the local Christians (or Jews 
or Muslims) in the minority are offended, their offense does matter, and 
their interests, unlike the Hindu family challenging the first monument, are 
constitutionally protected. 
II. CRITIQUING JUSTICE SCALIA’S APPROACH 
In interpreting the Constitution’s other religion clause—the Free Exer-
cise Clause—Justice Scalia has championed the notion of formal neutrality.  
With his opinion for the Court in Employment Division v. Smith,47 Justice 
 
45  Id. at 2753 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  I apologize for the gross distortion of Hindu theology that may 
result from referring to Hindus as “polytheists.”  See Brief of Amici Curiae the Hindu Am. Found. & 
Others at 8–9, Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (No. 03-1500) (“Hinduism propounds a the-
ology of panentheistic monotheism, recognizing that God can be called many names and may take many 
forms, and that the means or ways to salvation are many.”).  But see Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2881 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (referring to Hinduism as a “polytheistic sect”).  Regardless of the proper categori-
zation of Hindu theology, it is clear that Hindus do not worship the God of the Ten Commandments, and 
that Justice Scalia thus believes that the Establishment Clause permits the government to disregard their 
interests and beliefs. 
46  See generally KAREN FARRINGTON, HISTORICAL ATLAS OF RELIGIONS 140–41, 144–45, 154–55, 
164 (2002); ROBERT POLLOCK, THE EVERYTHING WORLD’S RELIGION BOOK:  DISCOVER THE BELIEFS, 
TRADITIONS, AND CULTURES OF ANCIENT AND MODERN RELIGIONS 97–98, 114–15, 169–71, 182–84 
(2002).  
47  494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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Scalia revolutionized the law of religious freedom by holding that “the right 
of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply 
with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the 
law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or pro-
scribes).”48   
That rule is ostensibly neutral.49  Formally, it treats all religions the 
same way; the adherents of any religion, whether they are Christians or Zo-
roastrians, may not practice their faith when doing so is inconsistent with a 
generally applicable state or federal law.  But of course, as Justice Scalia 
admitted, the political branches will be far more likely to pass generally ap-
plicable laws that interfere with the practice of minority religions than to 
enact laws that criminalize acts essential to the practice of majority relig-
ions.  That is to say, “leaving accommodation to the political process will 
place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely 
engaged in.”50  For that reason, many commentators have criticized Justice 
Scalia’s opinion in Smith for championing an empty formalism that is neu-
tral in theory, but decidedly discriminatory in practice.51 
But at least Smith pretended to official neutrality.  In his McCreary 
County dissent, by contrast, Justice Scalia has done away with the fig leaf 
of formal neutrality altogether.  The government is free to favor religion 
over nonreligion and, in the context of symbolism and endorsement, to fa-
vor majority religions over minority religions—and it may do so explicitly 
and facially.  What is more, this rule is permanently skewed in favor of 
Judeo-Christian monotheism.  Under Justice Scalia’s free exercise jurispru-
dence, if Christians ever become a minority (unlikely nationally anytime 
soon, but surely possible locally in many places), they will have no recourse 
when they find themselves to be the victims of majoritarian, generally ap-
plicable laws that impair their ability to worship according to the dictates of 
their faith.  What’s good for the goose is good for the gander.  But under 
Justice Scalia’s new establishment jurisprudence, Christians can rest as-
sured that, no matter what happens, they will never have to endure the 
alienation of government-sponsored proclamations of religious truths anti-
thetical to their own faith.  There is no requirement of governmental neu-
 
48  Id. at 879 (internal quotation marks omitted).  See generally Michael W. McConnell, Free Exer-
cise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1133–36 (1990); id. at 1111 (“The 
Smith decision is undoubtedly the most important development in the law of religious freedom in dec-
ades.”).  
49  See also Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 726 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (championing neutral-
ity as the touchstone of the Free Exercise Clause). 
50  Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
51  See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Resurrection of Religious Freedom?, 107 HARV. L. REV. 118, 
122–23 (1993); James D. Gordon, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91, 108 (1991); 
McConnell, supra note 15, at 139 (arguing that Smith “introduces a bias in favor of mainstream over 
nonmainstream religions”); McConnell, supra note 48, at 1133–36 (arguing that the Smith rule is not, in 
practice, neutral between religions). 
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trality, formal or otherwise; rather, there is an express constitutional prefer-
ence for certain religions. 
If Justice Scalia’s approach becomes the law, it will represent the sin-
gle greatest sea change in the history of the Establishment Clause.  The 
principle of governmental neutrality among religions and between religion 
and nonreligion has been a central tenet of the Court’s Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence for more than half a century—in essence, from the 
very beginning.52  All of the Justices have predicated their core understand-
ing of the religion clauses on the view that the government cannot “consti-
tutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as 
against nonbelievers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in 
the existence of God as against those religions founded on different be-
liefs.”53  Yet Justice Scalia would cast that decades-old cardinal understand-
ing aside in one fell swoop. 
Before Justice Scalia’s opinion, virtually everyone was operating 
within the neutrality paradigm.54  The point of disagreement was over 
 
52  One can find loose language in nineteenth-century opinions suggesting a constitutional preference 
for Christianity, rather than a constitutional mandate for religious neutrality.  See, e.g., Church of the 
Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 470–71 (1892).  But those cases did not consider the impact 
or the meaning of the Establishment Clause.  When the Court first confronted the meaning of the Estab-
lishment Clause, it arrived immediately at the mandate for governmental neutrality.  The Court first ar-
ticulated the neutrality principle in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947).  Everson 
is often referred to as the Court’s first Establishment Clause decision.  See, e.g., Diarmuid F. 
O’Scannlain, Catholic Lawyers in an Age of Secularism, 43 CATH. LAW. 1, 9 (2004).  That is not pre-
cisely true; the Court first decided an Establishment Clause case in 1899.  See Michael W. McConnell, 
The Supreme Court’s Earliest Church-State Cases:  Windows on Religious-Cultural-Political Conflict in 
the Early Republic, 37 TULSA L. REV. 7 (2001).  “Strictly speaking, several Establishment Clause fla-
vored cases were presented to the Court before Everson, but in each instance the Court narrowed its 
holding and decided the case [largely] on non-Establishment Clause grounds.”  Charles G. Warren, 
Comment, No Need to Stand on Ceremony, 54 MERCER L. REV. 1669, 1674 n.14 (2003).  Everson was 
the first case to incorporate the Establishment Clause against the states, see John C. Jeffries Jr. & James 
E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 294 n.74 (2001), and 
it represents the beginning of the Court’s modern understanding of religious freedom, see Douglas Lay-
cock, The Supreme Court and Religious Liberty, 40 CATH. LAW. 25, 49 (2000).  In other words, “Ever-
son provided the Court’s first serious attempt to explain the principle of nonestablishment.”  Jesse H. 
Choper, A Century of Religious Freedom, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1709, 1717 (2000).   
53  Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (striking down a Maryland constitutional provision 
requiring state officeholders to declare a belief in the existence of God). 
54  To be sure, there have been academic calls to reject the neutrality principle.  See, e.g., Gabriel A. 
Moens, The Menace of Neutrality in Religion, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 535.  But, with the exception of 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who once offered a partial challenge to the principle in a solo dissent that he 
quickly abandoned, see supra note 15, the Justices have all endorsed the neutrality mandate for over half 
a century.  
I hasten to add that the neutrality paradigm is, of course, no panacea.  The notion of neutrality means 
different things to different people, and there has been a great deal of discussion among academics and 
judges about the extent to which it is inadequate, manipulable, incapable of deciding hard cases, or even 
incoherent.  See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion Clauses in Terms of Liberty, Equal-
ity, and Free Speech Values—A Critical Analysis of “Neutrality Theory” and Charitable Choice, 13 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 243, 244–56 (1999) (arguing that the emphasis on neutrality 
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whether the Court’s current understanding of the scope of the neutrality 
mandate—that is to say, the Court’s working definition of neutrality—was, 
in effect, either too hostile toward religion55 or too supportive of majority 
religions.56  To be sure, there has been a major shift to the right in Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence over the course of the last quarter century.  
But that shift has occurred entirely within the neutrality paradigm.  Indeed, 
it has been a triumph of the neutrality principle. 
Traditionally, neutrality has competed with the alternative Establish-
ment Clause metaphor of strict separation between church and state.  The 
Court invoked both metaphors in its very first modern Establishment Clause 
decision,57 and it continues to do so today.58  In the more liberal pre-Reagan 
era, whenever the two metaphors seemed to come up against one another—
as might be the case when, for instance, religious schools ask for equal ac-
                                                                                                                           
undervalues the positive role that the government should be playing in advancing religious liberty and 
equality); Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 
DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 994 (1990) (noting that we can “agree on the principle of neutrality without hav-
ing agreed on anything at all”); Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 NW. 
U. L. REV. 146 (1986) (suggesting that strict neutrality may not always be adequate to protect religious 
liberty); Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Neutrality:  Broad Principles, For-
malism, and the Establishment Clause, 38 GA. L. REV. 489, 493 (2004) (concluding that “[t]here is no 
independent neutral truth or baseline to which [claims of neutrality] can be tethered”); John T. Valauri, 
The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 83, 92 (1986) (“The 
conceptual complexity, formality, and ambiguity of neutrality are interrelated and mutually reinforcing.  
They make the concept abstract and incomplete.”); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 878–84 (2000) 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court has employed the term “neutrality” in Establishment 
Clause cases in a number of senses); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., con-
curring) (“Neutrality is, however, a coat of many colors.”).  But however open ended and imperfect this 
principle may be, the Court has understood it to reflect the core of the Establishment Clause for half a 
century.   
55  See, e.g., Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305–06 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring) (“The fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that government neither engage in nor 
compel religious practices, that it effect no favoritism among sects or between religion and nonreligion, 
and that it work deterrence of no religious belief. . . . It is said, and I agree, that the attitude of govern-
ment toward religion must be one of neutrality.  But untutored devotion to the concept of neutrality can 
lead to invocation or approval of results which partake not simply of that noninterference and nonin-
volvement with the religious which the Constitution commands, but of a brooding and pervasive devo-
tion to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious.  Such results are not only not 
compelled by the Constitution, but, it seems to me, are prohibited by it.”). 
56  See, e.g., Daan Braveman, The Establishment Clause and the Course of Religious Neutrality, 45 
MD. L. REV. 352 (1986). 
57  See Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (“In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of relig-
ion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between Church and State.’”); id. at 15 (“The ‘es-
tablishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this:  Neither a state nor the 
Federal Government can . . . pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion 
over another.”). 
58  In last Term’s Ten Commandments cases, the wall of separation metaphor was invoked both by 
those who would uphold the monuments, see Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2859 (2005) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion) (noting that the Establishment Clause “demand[s] a separation be-
tween church and state”), and those who would strike them down, see id. at 2875 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that the religion clauses “erect a wall of separation between church and state”). 
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cess to government-funded financial support for teachers—the separationist 
metaphor typically won out.  The Court was willing to treat religious insti-
tutions differently than similarly situated secular institutions in order to 
maintain the separation of church and state and to avoid direct government 
funding of religious proselytization.59  (The Court did not view that willing-
ness as a repudiation of the neutrality principle, but rather as an implemen-
tation of a broader notion of neutrality that focused on total noninterference 
with religious institutions as the touchstone of governmental neutrality.)60 
In the last twenty-five years, however, the Court has steered a 180-
degree turn.  Neutrality—defined more narrowly as the equal treatment of 
religious and secular institutions and expression—has become the central 
focus of the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, driving notions of 
separation of church and state to the constitutional periphery.  Today, when 
the two metaphors appear to collide, neutrality generally trumps, even if it 
leads to significantly more governmental funding of religious activities.61  
Thus, for instance, the Court has held that it would not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause for a public university to fund sectarian, proselytizing reli-
gious newspapers with generally available student activities fees that are 
also used to support a wide variety of nonreligious expression,62 or for a lo-
cal government to include private religious schools on the list of eligible re-
cipients of publicly funded school vouchers.63  The key to all of these cases 
has been the demand for strict governmental neutrality; the Court explicitly 
 
59  See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (striking down state funding of private-school 
teacher salaries because much of the money went to teachers in religious schools). 
60  See Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43, 45 
(1997) (“In the Court’s view, separation is and always has been a means of maximizing religious liberty, 
of minimizing government interference with religion, and thus, of implementing neutrality among faiths 
and between faith and disbelief.”); id. at 48 (“In the no-aid theory, the baseline is government inactivity, 
because doing nothing neither helps nor hurts religion.  Any government aid to religion is a departure 
from that baseline, and thus a departure from neutrality.”). 
61  See Steven K. Green, Locke v. Davey and the Limits to Neutrality Theory, 77 TEMPLE L. REV. 
913, 914 (2004) (noting that the principle that “neutrality or equal treatment should prevail over separa-
tionist considerations” has predominated in the last two decades); id. at 933–42 (tracing the history of 
the neutrality/separation dichotomy); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman’s Future:  Vouchers, Sec-
tarian Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917, 918 
(2003) (noting that “norms of non-Establishment have been tending sharply toward the paradigm of 
Neutrality and away from the metaphorical wall of church-state separation”); Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering 
Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230, 246 (1993) (“The apparent successor to separa-
tionism is some version of religious neutrality, or equal religious liberty.”); id. at 256 (noting the “strong 
trend away from the separationist ethos of religion-state relations that prevailed in the liberal culture af-
ter the end of the second World War,” in favor of “a neutrality-based view”); Rosenberger v. Rector & 
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 873–84 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (tracing the develop-
ment of neutrality principles in Establishment Clause jurisprudence). 
62  Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819 (majority opinion). 
63  Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
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based its holdings on the fact that the challenged programs were facially 
neutral toward religion.64  
The strict neutrality principle has ascended over the vehement dissent 
of the Court’s more liberal Justices, who decry the breakdown of the wall of 
separation and the attendant increase in government financial support for re-
ligious activities.65  But these Justices could, one would have thought, at 
least have taken some solace in the fact that, while strict neutrality promotes 
some forms of religion in the public sphere, it precludes others.  Neutrality 
may lead to more government funding of religious activities through gener-
ally available funds, but it also precludes government-sponsored religious 
expression.  After all, as Justice Scalia put it, “[o]ne cannot say the word 
‘God,’ or ‘the Almighty,’ one cannot offer public supplication or thanksgiv-
ing, without contradicting the beliefs of some people.”66  Leading commen-
tators from across the political spectrum have therefore recognized that the 
recent triumph of the strict version of the neutrality principle necessarily 
renders unconstitutional most forms of governmental religious expression.67  
As Professor Ira Lupu has explained, the ascendancy of the strict neutrality 
principle “should result in the least-favored religion getting exactly as much 
protection as the most-favored religion.  A community that sponsors a 
Christmas display should be constitutionally obliged, for example, to devote 
equal time and resources to the holy days of Eastern religions to which 
some of its residents adhere.”68  Religious conservatives who champion 
 
64  See, e.g., id. at 653 (grounding decision in the fact that “the Ohio program is neutral in all re-
spects toward religion”); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809–14 (2000) (Thomas, J., plurality opin-
ion); cf. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839 (declaring that it would not violate the Establishment Clause for 
the University to open its student activities funds to religious publishers on equal terms with secular 
ones because “the guarantee of neutrality is respected, not offended, when the government, following 
neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends benefits to recipients whose ideologies and viewpoints, 
including religious ones, are broad and diverse”).  But see Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (permit-
ting over the dissent of Justices Scalia and Thomas, but not requiring, a state government to exempt reli-
gious studies from the scope of a taxpayer-funded college scholarship program in order to maintain a 
wall of separation between public money and sectarian proselytizing). 
65  See, e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. at 686–717 (Souter, J., dissenting); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 863–99 
(Souter, J., dissenting). 
66  McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2752–53 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
67  See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money:  Santa Fe, Mitchell v. 
Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 816–17 (2001) (“By 
contrast, government-sponsored religious messages can never achieve the status of neutrality among re-
ligions. . . . [B]ecause government cannot possibly be evenhanded in its distribution of respect, en-
dorsement, and support, the only sensible constitutional solution for the twenty-first century is some 
form of separationist principle designed to keep government from taking positions on matters of reli-
gious faith, celebration, and observance.” (footnote omitted)); Michael W. McConnell, State Action and 
the Supreme Court’s Emerging Consensus on the Line Between Establishment and Private Religious 
Expression, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 681, 682 (2001) (noting that the modern, neutrality-based trend in Estab-
lishment Clause cases necessarily implies that “[i]f religious activity is instigated [or] encouraged . . . by 
the government, the government’s acts are unconstitutional”). 
68  Lupu, supra note 61, at 277 (footnote omitted). 
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neutrality in order to obtain its benefits in funding cases must therefore also 
accept its costs in religious expression cases.  
But Justice Scalia has found a way to have his cake and eat it too.  His 
approach offers all of the advantages (from the standpoint of those who 
seek a greater role for Judeo-Christian religion in the public sphere) of the 
neutrality principle, but none of the costs.  Justice Scalia was willing to 
provide a crucial fifth vote for strict neutrality when it helped religious con-
servatives in the funding cases.69  And, as previously noted, he has been the 
leader of the Court’s move to formal neutrality as the touchstone of free ex-
ercise jurisprudence, a move that has the effect of favoring majority relig-
ions at the expense of minority religions.  But now Justice Scalia has turned 
around and rejected the neutrality principle in those circumstances in which 
it would operate against the interests of religious conservatives.  He refuses 
to accept the costs of the consistent application of the very principle that he 
has himself relied upon for decades to bring about major conservative 
changes in the jurisprudence of the religion clauses.70   
A. Inclusiveness? 
How does Justice Scalia justify this radical and seemingly unprincipled 
approach?  To begin with, his opinion is pervaded with a false—and, to 
many Americans, no doubt insulting—rhetoric of inclusiveness.  He ap-
pears at some level to recognize that governmental endorsement of religious 
beliefs that are not universally shared is inconsistent with the values under-
lying the Establishment Clause.  But he concludes that official honoring of 
God nonetheless does not present serious Establishment Clause concerns 
because generic invocations of God reflect the views of just about every-
one:   
The three most popular religions in the United States, Christianity, Judaism, 
and Islam—which combined account for 97.7% of all believers—are monothe-
istic.  All of them, moreover (Islam included), believe that the Ten Com-
mandments were given by God to Moses, and are divine prescriptions for a 
virtuous life.  Publicly honoring the Ten Commandments is thus indistinguish-
able, insofar as discriminating against other religions is concerned, from pub-
licly honoring God.  Both practices are recognized across such a broad and 
diverse range of the population—from Christians to Muslims—that they can-
 
69  See, e.g., Zellman, 536 U.S. at 639 (majority opinion) (upholding school voucher program by 5-4 
vote, with Justice Scalia in the majority); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 819 (majority opinion) (concluding 
by 5-4 vote, with Justice Scalia in the majority, that funding of religious expression on equal terms with 
secular expression would not violate the Establishment Clause). 
70  Cf. McConnell, supra note 15, at 166 (noting that, if Justice Scalia wants to be logically consis-
tent, he should, in light of his Free Exercise jurisprudence, read the Establishment Clause as precluding 
all “government action that singles out religion for favorable treatment”). 
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not be reasonably understood as a government endorsement of a particular re-
ligious viewpoint.71   
This claim that the Ten Commandments are universal because they 
“are recognized across . . . a broad and diverse range of the population—
from Christians to Muslims”—because, as Justice Scalia later says, they 
“are recognized by Judaism, Christianity, and Islam alike”72—is reminiscent 
of the scene in The Blues Brothers in which Jake and Elwood enter a rural 
bar and ask what kind of music they have there.  The bartender responds, 
“Oh we got both kinds. We got Country, and Western.”73  Justice Scalia is 
doing the same thing here—suggesting that the Ten Commandments do not 
unconstitutionally alienate because they are recognized by all three kinds of 
religion:  Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. 
It may well be true that adherents to a variety of faiths, be they Catho-
lics, Southern Baptists, Orthodox Jews, or Sunni Muslims, would all agree 
that a Ten Commandments monument is an inclusive memorial that does 
not endorse any particular faith.74  But the same cannot be said of atheists or 
Buddhists or Wiccans.  They would surely understand the government’s ac-
tions to be an endorsement of a particular religious viewpoint profoundly 
different from their own.  In claiming inclusiveness, Justice Scalia is simply 
glossing over these people, as if they do not exist at all.  Indeed, his statistic 
that the three principal Judeo-Christian religions account for 97.7% of all 
believers leaves the twenty-nine million American adults who do not pro-
fess to follow any religion out of the denominator altogether.75   
When he does acknowledge the existence of the sixteen percent of 
Americans who are non-Judeo-Christians,76 Justice Scalia takes a funda-
mentally counter-constitutional approach to their interests.  He concludes 
that “the Establishment Clause permits th[e] disregard of polytheists[,] . . . 
believers in unconcerned deities, [and] . . . devout atheists.”77  After all, he 
explains  
in the context of public acknowledgments of God there are legitimate compet-
ing interests:  On the one hand, the interest of that minority in not feeling “ex-
cluded”; but on the other, the interest of the overwhelming majority of 
religious believers in being able to give God thanks and supplication as a peo-
 
71  McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2753 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
72  Id. at 2762. 
73  THE BLUES BROTHERS (Universal Studios 1980). 
74  But see supra note 35. 
75  See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES tbl.67 (124th ed. 
2004), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/04statab/pop.pdf.  This brings to mind the 
first President Bush’s alleged declaration: “I don’t know that atheists should be considered as citizens, 
nor should they be considered patriots.  This is one nation under God.”  Jennifer Spevacek, Atheist 
Drops by to Waive the Flag, WASH. TIMES, July 27, 1989, at A4. 
76  See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, supra note 75, at tbl.67.  
77  McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2753 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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ple, and with respect to our national endeavors.  Our national tradition has re-
solved that conflict in favor of the majority.78 
This is a truly remarkable approach to constitutional law.  Our tradi-
tional understanding of constitutionalism focuses, of course, on the need for 
the judiciary to protect the minority from the tyranny of the majority.79  But 
here, Justice Scalia seeks to protect the majority from the inconvenience of 
having to respect the rights of the minority.  And he does so on the basis of 
the fact that, historically, the majority has often engaged in this type of dis-
criminatory behavior.   
Imagine if this reasoning had been employed in Brown v. Board of 
Education:   
In the context of segregation in public schools there are legitimate competing 
interests:  On the one hand, the interest of that minority in not feeling “infe-
rior”; but on the other, the interest of the overwhelming majority of Kansans in 
being able to educate their children in the presence of members of their own 
race alone.  Our national tradition has resolved that conflict in favor of the ma-
jority.   
What a sad Constitution that would be. 
Or, to make the analogy in some respects even more apt, imagine a law 
that provides that everyone but those of Arab ancestry can fly on airplanes 
or serve as law enforcement officers.  Such a law would be largely inclu-
sive—protecting over ninety-nine percent of the population—and would not 
take sides in the longstanding and divisive rift between the major races in 
this country.80  But it would nonetheless run afoul of our most basic notions 
of constitutional justice and fairness.  Ninety-nine (let alone eighty-four) 
percent inclusiveness is a constitutionally meaningless concept.  Yet Justice 
Scalia’s opinion in McCreary County takes just that approach. 
It is no answer to dub these analogies inapt on the theory that the Equal 
Protection Clause is explicitly concerned with the equal treatment of the 
races, whereas the Establishment Clause is not a mandate for the equal 
treatment of religions.  After all, government neutrality has been the heart 
of the Establishment Clause for decades, and Justice Scalia fully accepts the 
 
78  Id. at 2756; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 16–17, Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 
(2005) (No. 03-1500) (question from Justice Scalia) (“It is a profound religious message, but it’s a pro-
found religious message believed in by the vast majority of the American people, just as belief in mono-
theism is shared by a vast majority of the American people.  And our traditions show that there is 
nothing wrong with the government reflecting that.  I mean, we’re a tolerant society religiously, but just 
as the majority has to be tolerant of minority views in matters of religion, it seems to me the minority 
has to be tolerant of the majority’s ability to express its belief that government comes from God, which 
is what this is about. . . . [T]urn your eyes away if it’s such a big deal to you.”). 
79  See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
80  Cf. Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth:  Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REV. 
151 (1996) (noting that Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), which is 
famed for its progressive vision of equality between African Americans and whites, contains dicta de-
scribing the Chinese as an inferior race). 
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view that, absent the exception he intends to create for governmental en-
dorsement of monotheism, the Constitution mandates the equal treatment of 
all religions.81 
Nor is it an answer to say that the adherents to minority religions or to 
no religion suffer no significant harm when the majority chooses to publicly 
express an official communal belief in the biblical God.82  Justice Scalia’s 
dismissive characterization of the minority adherents’ interest as “not feel-
ing ‘excluded’”83  is reminiscent of his argument in dissent in Lee v. Weis-
man that students who do not believe in the biblical God suffer only a 
“minimal inconvenience” when exposed to official, government-led Judeo-
Christian prayer at a public junior high school graduation ceremony.84  In 
Weisman, Justice Scalia appeared oblivious to the fact that, for a nonbe-
liever or a practitioner of a non-Judeo-Christian religion, the harm of hav-
ing either to participate in a prayer that runs counter to one’s core religious 
beliefs or to be stared at and ostracized for not doing so is a very serious 
one—especially to a teenager trying to fit in and find acceptance in a world 
in which she is already an outsider.  And here, Justice Scalia seems blind to 
the fact that nonmonotheists suffer serious alienation when their govern-
ment erects and endorses “as a people” a religious monument that explicitly 
rejects and condemns nonmonotheists’ deeply held beliefs and practices.  
Even Justice Thomas candidly acknowledged “the honest and deeply felt 
offense [a nonbeliever] takes from th[is] government conduct.”85 
There can be no mistaking the fact that Justice Scalia’s approach is not 
inclusive in any meaningful constitutional sense.  His rule would create an 
explicitly unequal playing field in which the religious majority alone is enti-
tled to constitutional protection from significant governmentally imposed 
 
81  See McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2752 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (declaring that “the principle that 
the government cannot favor one religion over another” is “indeed a valid principle where public aid or 
assistance to religion is concerned, or where the free exercise of religion is at issue”); cf. Noah Feldman, 
From Liberty to Equality:  The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. REV. 673 
(2002); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution:  An Equal Protection Ap-
proach to Establishment Clause Litigation, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311 (1986).  On the similarity be-
tween laws favoring majority religions and laws favoring majority races, see Gary J. Simson, Laws 
Intentionally Favoring Mainstream Religions:  An Unhelpful Comparison to Race, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 
514 (1994). 
82  The same argument was, of course, made about segregation.  See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551 (“We 
consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced 
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority.  If this be so, it is not by 
reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction 
upon it.”). 
83  See also Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (question from Justice 
Scalia) (“[T]urn your eyes away if it’s such a big deal to you.”).   
84  505 U.S. 577, 646 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
85  Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2867 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also, e.g., Lynch 
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Endorsement sends a message to 
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying 
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.”). 
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harms.  The Constitution would afford greater protection to the adherents to 
certain preferred religions, and would allow the government to endorse and 
advance those religions, but not others.  This would represent a complete 
rethinking of the very nature of our country—of the role that religion plays 
in government, and of the rights of religious minorities.   
Explaining her decision to join the McCreary County majority and to 
reject Justice Scalia’s approach, Justice O’Connor offered a poignant chal-
lenge: 
At a time when we see around the world the violent consequences of the as-
sumption of religious authority by government, Americans may count them-
selves fortunate:  Our regard for constitutional boundaries has protected us 
from similar travails, while allowing private religious exercise to flourish. . . . 
Those who would renegotiate the boundaries between church and state must 
therefore answer a difficult question:  Why would we trade a system that has 
served us so well for one that has served others so poorly?86 
Why indeed?  Unconvincing claims of inclusiveness aside, how does 
Justice Scalia justify his attempt to radically restructure the fabric of our 
constitutional order?  His reasoning is based, he explains, on two concerns:  
(1) the need for greater consistency in Establishment Clause doctrine; and 
(2) the historical evidence of the original meaning of the Establishment 
Clause.87 
B. Consistency? 
He begins with consistency.  “What distinguishes the rule of law from 
the dictatorship of a shifting Supreme Court majority,” he argues, “is the 
absolutely indispensable requirement that judicial opinions be grounded in 
consistently applied principle.  That is what prevents judges from ruling 
now this way, now that—thumbs up or thumbs down—as their personal 
preferences dictate.”88  The Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is 
not, says Justice Scalia, characterized by such a grounding in consistent 
principle.89   
Although one might question Justice Scalia’s premise that absolute 
consistency is necessarily the ultimate goal of constitutional decisionmak-
ing,90 it is difficult to disagree with the basic point that the Court’s estab-
lishment jurisprudence wants for doctrinal coherence.  Over the last few 
decades, the Court has employed a potpourri of doctrinal tests to resolve Es-
tablishment Clause disputes, bouncing back and forth from one test to an-
 
86  McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2746 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
87  Id. at 2748–57 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
88  Id. at 2751. 
89  See id. at 2751–52, 2756 n.8. 
90  Cf. Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency:  On Equality, Integrity and Justice in Stare De-
cisis, 105 YALE L.J. 2031 (1996) (arguing that consistency is important in law only when it serves the 
underlying goal of justice). 
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other with little or no explanation, often failing to achieve a majority for the 
use or proper application of any one test in any particular case.91  All of 
those tests, however, proclaim fidelity to the neutrality principle.92  The dis-
pute is over how best to implement that principle doctrinally.   
But Justice Scalia is making a deeper point:  that the Court has not 
even been consistent with regard to the very existence of the neutrality prin-
ciple.  Although the Court has frequently trumpeted and applied that princi-
ple, there have been a number of cases in which the Justices have approved 
governmental action that does not appear to be neutral toward religion.  
“[W]hen the government relieves churches from the obligation to pay prop-
erty taxes, when it allows students to absent themselves from public school 
to take religious classes, and when it exempts religious organizations from 
generally applicable prohibitions of religious discrimination, it surely 
means to bestow a benefit on religious practice—but we have approved 
it.”93  Indeed, the Court has even upheld the Nebraska legislature’s practice 
of paying a chaplain to conduct a prayer at the opening of legislative ses-
sions—a practice that would seem to be the very opposite of governmental 
neutrality.94 
Justice Scalia is surely correct when he notes that a few of the Court’s 
decisions—particularly Marsh v. Chambers, which sanctioned legislative 
prayer—seem irreconcilable with a mandate for genuine governmental neu-
trality toward religion.95  But if the goal is, as Justice Scalia claims, a single 
consistently applied principle, his own approach, ironically, does not pro-
vide one.  In his view, neutrality (at least between religions) is the touch-
 
91  See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (noting that the Court’s “Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in hopeless disarray”); Kent 
Greenawalt, Quo Vadis:  The Status and Prospects of “Tests” Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 SUP. 
CT. REV. 323, 323 (noting that the Court’s jurisprudence in this area is “in nearly total disarray” and that 
“a student of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence [cannot] formulate any general tests that a majority of 
the Justices clearly support”).  “As exciting as this state of affairs is for those who welcome uncertainty 
and change, it is disquieting for lawyers and clients, for judges who must decide . . . establishment 
claims, and for Supreme Court Justices who aspire to stable principles of adjudication.”  Id. 
92  See Moens, supra note 54, at 550. 
93  McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2751 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding an exemption for churches from a federal prohibition against 
religious discrimination by employers); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding a prop-
erty tax exemption for church property); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding a law per-
mitting students to leave public schools during the school day to receive religious education at church)). 
94  See id. at 2752 (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)). 
95  It should be noted, however, that in three of the four cases cited by Justice Scalia, the Court at 
least purported (whether convincingly or not) to rest its decision on the neutrality mandate.  In Walz and 
Amos, the Court interpreted the neutrality principle as a call for “benevolent neutrality”—“permit[ting] 
religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.”  Walz, 397 U.S. at 669; see 
also Amos, 483 U.S. at 334.  In Zorach, the Court declared that refusing to allow students to leave 
school to receive religious instruction “would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the gov-
ernment show a callous indifference to religious groups.  That would be preferring those who believe in 
no religion over those who do believe.”  Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314. 
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stone “where public aid or assistance to religion is concerned,” but it is not 
required when the government acknowledges or endorses God.96  In other 
words, a different test applies to governmental expression cases than to all 
other Establishment Clause cases.  That would seem to be a tacit admission 
that the Establishment Clause, as the majority put it, “lacks the comfort of 
categorical absolutes”97—a notion that Justice Scalia had earlier mocked as 
a “lovely euphemism” for a concession that the Court has committed the 
unforgivable sin of failing to employ a single, consistent principle across 
the spectrum of establishment cases.98   
Every bit as much as the majority’s, then, Justice Scalia’s proposed 
rule fails to provide the consistent principle that he seeks.  Indeed, if we are 
after a consistent jurisprudence that purges the personal, political prefer-
ences of individual judges from the process of judging, we should be highly 
skeptical of a proposed rule that seems to employ the neutrality principle 
only when doing so favors the political interests of religious conservatives.   
At a more fundamental level, it is surprising that Justice Scalia would 
suggest that the Court’s failure to extend the neutrality principle to its full 
logical reach necessitates abandoning that principle altogether (at least as it 
applies to neutrality between religion and nonreligion and, in matters of 
governmental endorsement, to neutrality between monotheism and other re-
ligions).  To Justice Scalia, the rule of neutrality “is discredited because the 
Court has not had the courage (or the foolhardiness) to apply the neutrality 
principle consistently.”99  The reason, he says, for the Court’s “occasionally 
ignoring the neutrality principle” is 
the instinct for self-preservation, and the recognition that the Court, which 
“has no influence over either the sword or the purse,” cannot go too far down 
the road of an enforced neutrality that contradicts both historical fact and cur-
rent practice without losing all that sustains it:  the willingness of the people to 
accept its interpretation of the Constitution as definitive, in preference to the 
contrary interpretation of the democratically elected branches.100   
There is surely some truth to that observation.  The Court’s outlier 
opinions sanctioning non-neutral governmental actions may well have been 
motivated by a fear of the backlash that could result from the full enforce-
ment of the neutrality principle.  That same fear might also explain the 
Court’s recent decision to duck the Pledge of Allegiance case on standing 
grounds,101 thus avoiding having to grapple with the fact that, far from being 
 
96  McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2752 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
97  Id. at 2733 n.10 (majority opinion). 
98  Id. at 2751 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
99  Id. 
100  Id. at 2752 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)).  
101  See Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (declining to reach the merits 
of a constitutional challenge to the use of the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance on the 
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neutral toward religion, the words “under God” were inserted into the 
Pledge during the post-war Red Scare era for the express purpose of en-
couraging religious devotion and promoting the notion that ours is a reli-
gious nation.102  Indeed, one wonders whether the seemingly reluctant 
willingness of some of the Court’s more liberal Justices to invoke the no-
tion of “ceremonial deism”—the idea that certain religious expressions, 
such as “so help me God” in the Presidential oath and “In God We Trust” 
on our currency, have, through rote repetition and general ubiquity, lost 
their religious significance to the point that they no longer endorse relig-
ion103—is less the product of a genuine belief in the truth of that notion than 
the product of the fear that the nation may not tolerate striking down these 
emotionally popular but comparatively benign violations of the neutrality 
principle. 
But so what?  Why is the very existence of the neutrality principle fa-
tally “discredited” by the fact that, political realities being what they are, the 
Court seemingly does not have the courage or the naiveté to apply it to the 
full extent of its logical reach?  There have been many instances in Ameri-
can history in which the Court has failed to fully employ or enforce funda-
mental constitutional principles out of concern for the consequences.  
Consider, for instance, Brown v. Board of Education II,104 in which the 
Court famously allowed the southern states to drag their feet on the pace of 
desegregation—thus emasculating the first Brown decision and permitting 
another decade of widespread racial segregation—out of a fear that a de-
mand for timely compliance would prompt a violent backlash.105  Along the 
same lines is Naim v. Naim,106 in which the Court, at the insistence of Jus-
tice Frankfurter, dismissed on trumped-up technical grounds a case involv-
ing the constitutionality of Virginia’s antimiscegenation statute—a statute 
that was clearly unconstitutional under the reasoning of Brown.  Fearing 
                                                                                                                           
ground that the father who brought the lawsuit did not have standing to represent the interests of his 
daughter, over whom he did not have parental custody). 
102  The House Report accompanying the bill explained: 
At this moment of our history the principles underlying our American Government and the Ameri-
can way of life are under attack by a system whose philosophy is at direct odds with our own.  Our 
American Government is founded on the . . . belief that the human person is important because he 
was created by God and endowed by Him with certain inalienable rights which no civil authority 
may usurp.  The inclusion of God in our pledge therefore would further acknowledge the depend-
ence of our people and our Government upon the moral directions of the Creator.  At the same 
time it would serve to deny the atheistic and materialistic concepts of communism . . . . 
H.R. REP. NO. 83-1693, at 1–2 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339, 2340.  Upon signing the 
act, President Eisenhower declared:  “From this day forward, the millions of our school children will 
daily proclaim in every city and town, every village and rural schoolhouse, the dedication of our Nation 
and our people to the Almighty.”  100 CONG. REC. 8618 (1954). 
103  See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
104  349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
105  See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS:  THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 314–16 (2004). 
106  350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam); see also Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956). 
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that the South would not accept a decision striking such a strong emotional 
chord so soon after the original Brown decision, the Court balked, allowing 
the vile ban on interracial marriage to persist for a dozen more years.107  
One might agree or disagree with the Court’s decision to preference practi-
cal considerations over principle in these cases, but it is another thing alto-
gether to suggest that that pragmatic decision “discredits” the underlying 
principle itself—discredits, that is, Brown v. Board of Education108 and the 
Court’s original conclusion that racial segregation is incompatible with the 
Equal Protection Clause.   
To the same effect, consider the many McCarthy Era First Amendment 
cases in which the Court shied away from protecting the free speech and as-
sociation rights of Communists out of fear of political backlash from a 
paranoid Congress and a frenzied populace.109  Those cases may be said to 
“discredit” a number of things, including, perhaps, the Court itself, but they 
surely do not discredit the notion that the First Amendment protects politi-
cal dissenters. 
The sad fact is that sometimes genuine equality for scorned minorities 
and full enforcement of unpopular rights are politically unpalatable.  And 
sometimes the Court has chosen to bow to that fact, even at the expense of 
doctrinal purity.110  The possible ideal of complete judicial independence is 
tempered by the reality that the Court depends upon Congress for its 
budget, on the President to enforce its decisions, and on public acceptance 
of its decisions for its institutional legitimacy.  Fears of jurisdiction strip-
ping, impeachment, widespread disobedience and the like have sometimes 
tempered the full reach of constitutional ideals.  That may not be satisfying, 
but it is and has always been a reality of our constitutional scheme.  To 
suggest that a principle protecting unpopular minorities or enforcing un-
popular rights must be abandoned solely because the Court has feared to ex-
tend it immediately to its logical extreme is to impose a perverse heckler’s 
veto and to reject a great bulk of modern constitutional liberty.  
The logical course of action when faced with a large body of consis-
tent, principled cases and a few outliers is not to reject the general rule, but 
 
107  See Del Dickson, State Court Defiance and the Limits of Supreme Court Authority:  Williams v. 
Georgia Revisited, 103 YALE L.J. 1423, 1475–76 (1994); Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of 
Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 243 (1991).  The Court did not strike down Virginia’s 
statute until 1967.  See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
108  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
109  See Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court Deci-
sionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 1463–64 (2001) (citing, inter alia, Barenblatt v. United States, 360 
U.S. 109 (1959) (affirming the power of the House Un-American Activities Committee), and Uphaus v. 
Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959) (upholding the unpreempted authority of the states to prosecute subversive 
activity aimed at state institutions)). 
110  See generally id.   
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rather to overrule the outliers,111 or, if that is not politically feasible, to con-
fine them to their facts.112  Indeed, rejecting the general rule altogether 
would not seem to serve Justice Scalia’s professed goals at all.  If it is ap-
parent and genuine apolitical judicial decisionmaking that Justice Scalia is 
after, his proposed solution would be an odd way to go about obtaining it.  
To paraphrase another Justice Scalia dissent,113 one would not expect to read 
the sentence “What distinguishes the rule of law from the dictatorship of a 
shifting Supreme Court majority is the absolutely indispensable require-
ment that judicial opinions be grounded in consistently applied principle” in 
an opinion calling for the abandonment of the one principle that has been at 
the heart of the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence for more than 
half a century.  
C. Originalism? 
Which brings us to the heart of the matter.  Even if Justice Scalia is 
correct that consistency demands a new rule for Establishment Clause 
cases, why this one?  There is a nearly infinite number of possible rules that 
the Court could adopt.  Why settle on the facially convoluted, tongue-
twister of a notion that the government may favor religion over nonreligion, 
but may not favor nonreligion over religion,114 and must be neutral between 
the various religions, except that it can acknowledge and endorse God, but 
only through nonsectarian invocations of the monotheistic God of the Bi-
ble?  To ask Justice Scalia’s question, “Who says so?  Surely not the words 
of the Constitution.”115 
Surely not.  Nor is this rule dictated by precedent, given that the Court 
has consistently rejected it.  Rather, claims Justice Scalia, this rule is man-
dated by history.  One can determine the meaning of the Establishment 
Clause by looking to historical practice to determine what the framing gen-
eration understood the clause to permit and to prohibit.   
History reveals that, in the nascent years of the Republic, Presidents, 
Congress, and even the Supreme Court publicly invoked God.116  As such, 
says Justice Scalia, we know that governmental invocations and endorse-
 
111  See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2883 n.22 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (calling for 
the overruling of Marsh v. Chambers because legislative prayer is inconsistent with the neutrality prin-
ciple). 
112  See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2733 n.10 (2005) (majority opinion) (treating 
legislative prayer dismissively as a unique deviation from the general rule without elaboration). 
113  Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 984–85 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“‘Liberty 
finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.’  One might have feared to encounter this august and sono-
rous phrase in an opinion defending the real Roe v. Wade, rather than the revised version fabricated to-
day by the authors of the joint opinion.”). 
114  See also Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 736 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (declaring that 
“disfavoring of religion is positively antagonistic to the purposes of the Religion Clauses”). 
115  McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2750 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
116  See id. at 2748–50. 
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ments of God do not violate the Establishment Clause.117  But at the same 
time, virtually every one of those early invocations was of a generic God; 
the Framers publicly endorsed “God,” but not “Jesus Christ.”  As such, he 
says, we can further deduce that the Establishment Clause permits only 
broad, nonsectarian invocations of God; it precludes narrow endorsements 
of particular, disputed monotheistic beliefs.118 
Justice Scalia derives these conclusions from the originalist premise 
that the Establishment Clause must have the exact same meaning and scope 
today that it had in the eighteenth century.  Of course, that premise is open 
to question.119  But let us accept it, if only for the sake of argument.120  Even 
so, Justice Scalia’s conclusions do not follow from his evidence.  
To begin with, it does not necessarily follow from the fact that many 
early Presidents and Congresses engaged in religious prayer and blessing 
that the Establishment Clause was generally understood to allow official in-
vocations of the divine.  Governmental statements and actions in the dec-
ades immediately after ratification are useful data points, but they are not 
always the best indicia of original meaning.  
That is especially true here.  Many of Justice Scalia’s sources are 
speeches made by public officials.  But “when public officials deliver pub-
lic speeches, we recognize that their words are not exclusively a transmis-
sion from the government because those oratories have embedded within 
them the inherently personal views of the speaker as an individual member 
of the polity.”121  Today, when President Bush closes a speech with “God 
bless the United States,” we understand him to be conveying his personal 
religious views and prayers—which he is surely entitled to do, even when 
he speaks in his official capacity—not the official views of the institution of 
the presidency, or of the national government.  The same was true of Presi-
dents Washington and Adams, upon whose speeches Justice Scalia relies.  
As such, the content of those speeches tells us little about whether the gov-
ernment is permitted to endorse religion. 
What is more, Justice Scalia is selectively drawing upon the historical 
record to give the appearance of a historical consensus that did not exist.  
He holds out as unambiguous evidence of a universally understood original 
meaning actions that, in fact, many of the Framers themselves strongly con-
 
117  See id. at 2850. 
118  See id. at 2755. 
119  See, e.g., Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism:  An Empirical Analysis of the Court’s Quest for 
Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217, 226–34 (2004) (noting some of the many potential faults of 
originalism). 
120  While I am willing to accept Justice Scalia’s originalist premise arguendo, ultimately, the fact 
that Justice Scalia’s dissent fails to achieve the alleged benefits of originalism might well provide a 
powerful reason not to adopt his methodology in the first place.  That is to say, the hash that ends up be-
ing made of the historical record here by one of the brightest and most talented of originalist judges 
might tell us something about the desirability and the viability of originalism as a constitutional theory. 
121  Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2883 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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demned as unconstitutional.122  For instance, James Madison—who origi-
nally proposed the Establishment Clause—fought the First Congress’s deci-
sion to hire a legislative chaplain,123 and condemned it as “a palpable 
violation of . . . Constitutional principles.”124  Similarly, Thomas Jefferson 
refused to issue Thanksgiving prayers because he understood them to vio-
late the Establishment Clause’s prohibition against governmental “recom-
mendation” of religion.125  Madison also refused during his early years in 
office to issue calls for Thanksgiving prayer.  Later, during the politically 
contentious War of 1812, he did issue such calls, but he subsequently con-
fessed that his doing so had violated the Constitution.126   
As Justice Souter has previously explained,  
in the face of the separationist dissent, [governmental actions of the type relied 
upon by Justice Scalia] prove, at best, that the Framers simply did not share a 
common understanding of the Establishment Clause, and, at worst, that they, 
like other politicians, could raise constitutional ideals one day and turn their 
backs on them the next.127   
The fact that sometimes even the Framers did not have the political will to 
follow the Constitution does not provide the government with license to 
continue to do so today.  Indeed, a constitutionalism that derives current 
meaning solely from the governmental actions in the years immediately fol-
lowing ratification would, in many instances, be wholly unacceptable.  
Among other things, it would allow the government to criminalize political 
dissent and to mandate racial segregation.128 
Once we expand our search for the original meaning beyond Justice 
Scalia’s often dubious sources—beyond, that is, the statements and actions 
of the government officials in the years after the ratification of the First 
 
122  See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 623–26 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring). 
123  See Letter from J. Madison to E. Livingston (July 10, 1822), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION 105 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
124  JAMES MADISON, DETATCHED MEMORANDA 558 (Elizabeth Fleet ed., 1946). 
125  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. S. Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 123, at 98–99. 
126  See MADISON, supra note 124, at 560; see also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 915 (1789) (noting that 
Representative Thomas Tucker voted against the congressional resolution urging President Washington 
to issue a Thanksgiving proclamation on the ground that “it is a religious matter, and, as such, is pro-
scribed to us”). 
127  Weisman, 505 U.S. at 626 (Souter, J., concurring). 
128  See id. (“Ten years after proposing the First Amendment, Congress passed the Alien and Sedi-
tion Acts, measures patently unconstitutional by modern standards.  If the early Congress’s political ac-
tions were determinative, and not merely relevant, evidence of constitutional meaning, we would have to 
gut our current First Amendment doctrine to make room for political censorship.”); Van Orden v. Perry, 
125 S. Ct. 2854, 2885 n.27 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“To adopt such an interpretive approach 
would misguidedly give authoritative weight to the fact that the Congress that passed the Fourteenth 
Amendment also enacted laws that tolerated segregation, and the fact that the Congress that passed the 
First Amendment also enacted laws, such as the Alien and Sedition Act, that indisputably violated our 
present understanding of the First Amendment.”). 
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Amendment—the history paints a very different picture.  As others have 
persuasively demonstrated, and I will not retread that ground here, the text, 
historical antecedents, drafting history, and debate surrounding the adoption 
of the Establishment Clause all provide compelling, though perhaps not 
conclusive, evidence that the clause was intended and originally understood 
to preclude government preference for particular religions or for religion 
over nonreligion, as the Court has long understood.129  Justice Scalia ignores 
this voluminous evidence. 
In any event, even assuming that Justice Scalia’s sources are the best 
indicia of the original meaning of the Establishment Clause, those sources 
still do not mandate Justice Scalia’s rule—in particular, his conclusion that 
the government may endorse generic monotheism but not generic or sectar-
ian Christianity.  Why should it matter that the framing generation preferred 
to refer to the divine using certain terms—“Almighty God,” “the Creator,” 
“that Almighty Being,” etc.—rather than others?  Justice Scalia’s historical 
sources do not, for instance, include references to “Merciful God” or the 
“Supreme Being.”  Does that mean that the Establishment Clause forbids 
the government to use those terms?  Surely not.  But then why does the ab-
sence of official endorsements of “Jesus Christ” or the “Holy Trinity” indi-
cate that those endorsements are precluded by the Establishment Clause?  
Evidence that the framing generation routinely engaged in certain practices 
might, in some circumstances, tell us what the Constitution permits.  But, as 
a matter of common sense, that argument has little traction in reverse.  Evi-
dence that the framing generation did not engage in certain practices is a 
particularly bad measure of what the Constitution prohibits, absent both 
concrete indicia of the reasons why the Framers chose not to engage in 
those practices and some theoretical explanation for why the Constitution 
would prohibit those practices, while permitting others.130  Justice Scalia has 
provided neither.  Rather, he seems to assume that the mere fact that the 
Framers did not choose sectarian words is itself sufficient to establish that 
the Constitution does not allow their use.  But that cannot possibly be true.   
To begin with, the particular words chosen by the framing generation 
can illuminate constitutional meaning only if that choice was a conscious 
reflection of the conventional understanding of the limits of the constitu-
tional prohibition at issue—only if, that is, the fact that the Framers chose 
 
129  See, e.g., Weisman, 505 U.S. at 612–16 (Souter, J., concurring); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 91–119 (1986); Douglas Laycock, 
“Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion:  A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875 
(1986). 
130  Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 949 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“While we have 
indicated that the express consideration and resolution of difficult constitutional issues by the First Con-
gress in particular provides contemporaneous and weighty evidence of the Constitution’s meaning . . . , 
we have never suggested that the failure of the early Congresses to address the scope of federal power in 
a particular area or to exercise a particular authority was an argument against its existence.” (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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those words can fairly be taken to indicate that they believed that the Con-
stitution did not allow them to choose others.   
By way of analogy, during the Adams Administration, one finds a 
great many persons who were highly critical of President Adams, but virtu-
ally none who were critical of former President Washington.131  It would be 
nonsensical to take that fact as conclusive evidence that the Framers under-
stood the First Amendment to permit criticism of the current President but 
to preclude criticism of former Presidents.  The lack of criticism of Wash-
ington tells us a great deal about the esteem in which he was held by his 
contemporaries—and perhaps also about the social conventions of the era.  
It tells us nothing about the meaning of the First Amendment. 
The same is true here.  Justice Scalia has given us no evidence that the 
mere fact that the Framers preferred “Almighty God” to “Jesus Christ” in-
dicates that they felt that they had no constitutional choice in the matter.  
The closest that he comes is a footnote that could be read as an unsupported 
suggestion that if the Framers thought that they could invoke the Christian 
God, rather than simply the generic God of monotheism, “one would expect 
Christ regularly to be invoked, which He is not.”132 
But there are many equally or more plausible explanations for the 
Framers’ choice of words.  For one thing, they may have eschewed invok-
ing Christ not because they felt that they were precluded from doing so, but 
rather because they did not believe in Christ.  While there is no scholarly 
consensus, many historians have concluded that Jefferson, Washington, 
Madison, Adams, and a great many other leading lights of the framing gen-
eration were Deists, rather than Christians.133  In this regard, it is especially 
egregious for Justice Scalia to rely on their statements as evidence that the 
Constitution permits explicit endorsement of the biblical God.  In endorsing 
 
131  See, e.g., DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 484, 532–34 (2001). 
132  McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2753 n.3 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice 
Scalia’s only evidence that the government cannot favor Christians over Jews and Muslims is the fact 
that George Washington wrote a letter to a Jewish congregation in Rhode Island in which he assured the 
Jews that “[a]ll possess alike liberty of conscience and immunities of citizenship.  It is now no more that 
toleration is spoken of, as if it was by the indulgence of one class of people, that another enjoyed the ex-
ercise of their inherent natural rights.”  6 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON:  PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 
285 (W.W. Abbott ed., 1996).  But that quotation is about free exercise of religion; it says nothing about 
whether the government can endorse religion.  And, in any event, it says that “all possess alike liberty,” 
not just all Judeo-Christian monotheists. 
133  See, e.g., McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2745 n.26; LAMBERT, supra note 22, at 161; Laura 
Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular:  A Foundational Challenge to 
First Amendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 837, 875–76 (1995).  Deism was “a religious per-
spective spawned by the Enlightenment, a European philosophy that emphasized reason over revelation 
as the best guide for human progress, and nature over Scripture as the clearest window onto God.”  
LAMBERT, supra note 21, at 159–60.  Deists denied the divinity of Christ and viewed many Christian 
beliefs as “superstitions.”  Id. at 160–61, 178. 
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a generic “God,” the Deist Framers may not have been invoking the God of 
the Bible at all.134   
Or perhaps the framing generation’s use of broader terms to invoke the 
divine was simply the convention of the era, rather than a reaction to per-
ceived constitutional constraints.  Indeed, similar references permeate the 
major pre-Constitutional documents that were not, of course, constrained by 
the not-yet-existent Establishment Clause.  The Declaration of Independ-
ence, for instance, refers to the “Creator.”  The Articles of Confederation 
refer to the “Great Governor of the World.”135  Jefferson’s Bill for Estab-
lishing Religious Freedom of 1779 refers to “Almighty God.”136  And Madi-
son’s famous “Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Assessments, 1785” refers to “the Creator” and “the Supreme Lawgiver of 
the Universe.”137  
Or perhaps the decision to employ broad, nonsectarian terms was sim-
ply a political one, made out of either a genuine respect for religious mi-
norities or a shrewd desire to avoid alienating voters.  The fact that no 
President has ever criticized NASCAR for not being a real sport says noth-
ing about whether the Constitution would permit the President to do so.   
Justice Scalia has provided no evidence to support a conclusion that the 
Framers chose broad words not for one of these (or a hundred other) rea-
sons, but rather because of a perceived constitutional necessity.  Without 
such evidence, Justice Scalia’s sources simply cannot sustain the rule that 
he would derive from them. 
Justice Scalia has also failed to provide any theoretical justification for 
his conclusion that the Constitution allows broad invocations of monothe-
ism, but not narrow invocations of Christianity.  One cannot conclude from 
the fact that the Framers did X but not Y that the Constitution permits X but 
not Y, unless one can articulate a principled rule that explains why, in light 
of the text and purpose of the constitutional provision at issue, X would be 
permissible, but Y would not.  To return to the example of political criticism 
during the Adams administration, one cannot infer from the fact that the 
 
134  See LAMBERT, supra note 22, at 172, 174, 178 (noting that Deists did not believe in a vengeful 
God who interfered in the affairs of men, and believed that the Bible, “far from containing divine truth, 
is a mixture of sound moral instruction and errors and superstitions” and should not be treated as God’s 
word); cf. Finkelman, supra note 22, at 1509 (“The primary author of the Declaration, Thomas Jeffer-
son, was a deist, and his references to a supreme being are clearly not references to the God of the Bible.  
Rather, they are invocations of enlightenment notions of natural rights.”).  As such, Justice Scalia’s 
claim that, by invoking “God (in the singular, and with a capital G),” the Framers must necessarily have 
been invoking the biblical God and endorsing the Ten Commandments, McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 
2753 n.3, ignores the existence of one of the principal religions of the framing era. 
135  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII. 
136  Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, 1779, reprinted in 5 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 123, at 77. 
137  James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 1785, reprinted in 
5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 123, at 82. 
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framing generation criticized Adams but not Washington that the First 
Amendment allows criticism of current but not former Presidents, because 
there is nothing in the text of the Free Speech Clause that would support 
such a distinction, and the distinction would in no way advance the values 
underlying the guarantee of freedom of speech.  
The same is true here.  There is no basis in the text of the Establish-
ment Clause for Justice Scalia’s distinction, and, save for his mistaken 
claims of inclusiveness, he has provided absolutely no theoretical explana-
tion of how allowing the government to endorse monotheism, but not al-
lowing the government to endorse any specific sect of monotheism (or any 
other set of religious beliefs), can be said to advance any notion of religious 
liberty protected by that clause.  If the purpose of the Establishment Clause 
is to protect religious minorities, then why protect some minorities, but not 
others?  If the purpose of the Clause is to avoid formal coercion of religious 
practices, but not to interfere with the ability of a majority of the people to 
acknowledge and give thanks to their God through the mechanism of their 
government, then why preclude them from acknowledging the Christian 
God that the vast majority of them worship?  The only possible underlying 
constitutional purpose that might be advanced by Justice Scalia’s rule 
would be a purpose to promote and protect biblical monotheism generally, 
but to treat all of its various sects—but not any other religious groups—
equally.  A purpose, that is, to prefer Islam to Hinduism, but not Christian-
ity to Islam.  But Justice Scalia has provided absolutely no evidence that 
this was the impetus behind, or the value underlying, the Constitution’s re-
ligion clauses, and to the best of my knowledge no legal scholar or historian 
has ever so posited.138   
In sum, it requires an enormous and unjustifiable leap of faith to inter-
pret the framing generation’s broad invocations of God as conclusive evi-
dence that the Constitution allows such invocations, but does not allow 
more narrow endorsements of particular sects of Judeo-Christian monothe-
ism.   
If one were determined to derive a constitutional rule from the fact that 
early government actors frequently invoked God, a few possibilities come 
to mind.  First, one could conclude that the government is free to endorse 
whatever religion it wants.  That is to say, these actions could be read as an 
indication that the Establishment Clause does not bar governmental procla-
mation and acknowledgment of religion.  But that rule would seem to run 
contrary to the very point of the religion clauses:  to protect religious mi-
norities.  The historical evidence is overwhelming that one of the primary 
 
138  Indeed, if this is the underlying purpose of the Establishment Clause, then why does Justice 
Scalia continue to endorse the proposition that, when it comes to government funding, the Constitution 
necessitates the equal treatment of all religions? 
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purposes of the First Amendment was the protection of minority religions 
through the guarantee that the government would treat all religions alike.139 
Alternatively, one could take these invocations as an indication that the 
Establishment Clause permits the government to endorse only nonsectarian 
Christianity.  That was, after all, the religion actually being invoked and 
supported in Justice Scalia’s historical examples,140 and there is absolutely 
no evidence that the speakers chose broad words out of a perceived consti-
tutional mandate to be solicitous of other forms of monotheism.  As Justice 
Stevens explains in his Van Orden dissent, some members of the framing 
generation apparently understood the Establishment Clause to protect only 
Christians.141  In Joseph Story’s opinion,  
[p]robably at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and of the [First] 
amendment . . . , the general, if not the universal sentiment in America was, 
that christianity ought to receive encouragement from the state. . . . An attempt 
to level all religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to hold all in utter 
indifference, would have created universal disapprobation, if not universal in-
dignation.142   
According to Story, the “real object of the amendment was, not to counte-
nance, much less to advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by 
prostrating christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among christian sects.”143  
But this interpretation also fails to protect all religious minorities.  And it 
runs afoul of the substantial contrary evidence that the Framers sought to 
ensure the equal treatment of all religions, even non-Christian (and indeed 
even non-Judeo-Christian) ones.144 
 
139  See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 919, 
932–34 (2004); McConnell, supra note 48, at 1130–31; Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 133, at 874–
961.  To take just one example, the amendments proposed by Virginia, North Carolina, New York, and 
Rhode Island as precursors to the Establishment Clause all provided that no particular “religious sect or 
society ought to be favored or established by law in preference to others.”  3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, 
DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 659 (Ayer Co. 1988) (1888); 4 id. at 244; 
1 id. at 328, 334.  In Madison’s words, “[a]mong the features peculiar to the political system of the 
United States is the perfect equality of rights which it secures to every religious sect.”  Letter from 
James Madison to Dr. de la Motta (Aug., 1820), in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON, 1816–1828, at 178, 179 (Phillip R. Fendall ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1867).   
140  Unless the speakers were endorsing Deism, a religion that does not embrace the God of the Bible 
and the Ten Commandments at all. 
141  See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2885–87 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
142  JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1874, at 593 
(1851) (footnote omitted). 
143  Id. § 1877, at 594. 
144  For instance, Jefferson recounts evidence that, during the debate over Virginia’s Act for Estab-
lishing Religious Freedom—a major precursor to the Establishment Clause—“a great majority . . . 
meant to comprehend, within the mantle of its protection, the Jew and the Gentile, the Christian and the 
Mohametan, the Hindoo, and Infidel of every denomination.”  1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 
67 (Albert E. Bergh ed., 1907).  In the North Carolina ratification debate, James Iredell discussed Article 
VI, clause 3, which prohibits religious tests for public office:  “[I]t is objected that the people of Amer-
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In light of the constitutional purpose to protect religious minorities and 
majorities alike, if one were determined to engage in the mystical practice 
of reading tea leaves to ascertain constitutional meaning from the words 
that the Framers did not say, Justice Scalia’s sources might better be taken 
to suggest an original understanding that the government cannot engage in 
acknowledgment or endorsement of disputed religious principles.  That 
would better explain why they tended to invoke God in terms broad enough 
to be acceptable to all of the principal religious minorities of the day, even 
Deists and Jews.  And unlike Justice Scalia’s rule, it would establish a prin-
ciple of liberty that accords with the underlying purpose of the Establish-
ment Clause, rather than simply articulating an abstract description of the 
framing generation’s actions at a level of generality so specific as to be ut-
terly devoid of principle.  It would also have the advantage of according 
with the bulk of the other historical evidence of original meaning, with 
more than a half century of precedent, and with notions of genuine religious 
equality. 
Of course, today, that rule would produce a different result.  There is 
far wider and deeper religious diversity in this country today than there was 
in the eighteenth century, to the point that governmental acknowledgment 
or endorsement of religion is no longer possible without alienating and dis-
missing the views of millions of Americans.   
Finally, there is yet another reason why the history does not support 
Justice Scalia’s proposed rule.  Justice Scalia asserts that, of the early his-
torical sources upon which he has relied, only one constitutes a narrow gov-
ernmental endorsement of Christianity—President Adams’s 1798 
Thanksgiving proclamation asking God for absolution “through the Re-
deemer of the World.”145  That one exception would seem, on its own, to 
disprove the rule.  If the decision to use broad terms was the product not of 
a free choice to prefer those terms, but rather of a universal understanding 
that the Establishment Clause precluded endorsement of Christianity over 
other forms of monotheism, then why did Adams feel entitled to endorse 
Christianity, and why wasn’t there an outcry and controversy when he—the 
President of the United States—did so in such a public fashion?146 
                                                                                                                           
ica may perhaps choose representatives who have no religion at all, and that Pagans and Mahometans 
may be admitted into offices.  But how is it possible to exclude any set of men, without taking away that 
principle of religious freedom which we ourselves so warmly contend for?”  4 ELLIOT, supra note 139, 
at 197; see also, e.g., James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 
1785, in THE COMPLETE MADISON 299–301 (S. Padover ed., 1953) (“Who does not see that the same 
authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the 
same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects?”); Underkuffler-Freund, su-
pra note 133, at 926–27 (quoting similar statements in the Massachusetts ratification convention); Letter 
from J. Madison to E. Livingston, supra note 123, at 105 (noting “the equality of all religious sects in 
the eye of the Constitution”). 
145  McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2755 & n.5 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
146  As noted above, there was a dispute and outcry among the framing generation as to whether the 
government was permitted to endorse religion at all.  But Justice Scalia points to no indication in the his-
100:1097  (2006) A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? 
 1135
But in any event, Justice Scalia is simply wrong when he asserts that, 
this one exception aside, “all [of] the other examples of our Government’s 
favoring religion that [he] cited,” and in particular “[a]ll of the actions of 
. . . the First Congress upon which [he] relied, . . . invoked God, but not Je-
sus Christ.”147  That is demonstrably false. 
In Justice Scalia’s own words, he “relied primarily upon official acts 
and official proclamations of the United States or of the component 
branches of its Government, including the First Congress’s beginning of the 
tradition of legislative prayer to God, [and] its appointment of congressional 
chaplains.”148  But the First Congress did not just begin a tradition of “legis-
lative prayer to God;” it began a tradition of legislative prayer to Jesus 
Christ.  That is to say, the practice of appointing congressional chaplains 
has not endorsed generic monotheism; it has endorsed Christianity.  Every 
single one of the 121 congressional chaplains in American history has been 
an ordained Christian minister.149  And from the very beginning, their 
prayers have been overtly Christian in nature.  For instance, Bishop William 
White, who served as Senate Chaplain from 1790 to 1800, explained his 
typical practice in that post: 
My practice, in the presence of each house of congress, was in the following 
series:  the Lord’s prayer; the collect Ash Wednesday; that for peace; that for 
grace; the prayer for the President of the United States; the prayer for Con-
gress; the prayer for all conditions of men; the general thanksgiving; St. Chry-
sostom’s Prayer; the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, etc.150 
What is more, the congressional chaplains did not just conduct Christian 
prayers at the opening of sessions of Congress.  They also held Sunday 
Christian church services in the Capitol Building—services that were open 
to and widely attended by the general public.151 
Indeed, Justice Scalia so mischaracterizes the history that he errs even 
in declaring that only one of the early presidential Thanksgiving proclama-
tions—the one issued by President Adams in 1798—invoked Jesus Christ 
rather than a generic God.152  In fact, during his presidency, Adams issued 
                                                                                                                           
torical record that endorsements of Christianity rather than monotheism produced any greater outcry or 
controversy. 
147  McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2755 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
148  Id. at 2754. 
149  See MILDRED AMER, HOUSE AND SENATE CHAPLAINS (2005), available at http://www.senate. 
gov/reference/resources/pdf/RS20427.pdf.  
150  Letter from Bishop William White to Reverend Henry D. Johns (Dec. 29, 1830), reprinted in 
BIRD WILSON, MEMOIR OF THE LIFE OF THE RIGHT REVEREND WILLIAM WHITE, D.D., BISHOP OF THE 
PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 322 (1939). 
151  See 1 ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 499–501 (1950); 
Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 
2105 (1996). 
152  See McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2755 & n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (declaring that “virtually 
all Thanksgiving Proclamations throughout our history . . . have invoked God, but not Jesus Christ,” and 
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two Thanksgiving proclamations, both of which were of a decidedly Chris-
tian nature.  Adams’s second proclamation, issued just a year after the one 
noted by Justice Scalia, explicitly invoked the Christian Trinity and asked 
all Americans to  
call to mind our numerous offenses against the Most High God, confess them 
before Him with the sincerest penitence, implore His pardoning mercy, 
through the Great Mediator and Redeemer, for our past transgressions, and that 
through the grace of His Holy Spirit we may be disposed and enabled to yield 
a more suitable obedience to His righteous requisitions in time to come.153 
This proclamation was written for the President by the Reverend Ashbel 
Green, the Chaplain of the House of Representatives.  In his autobiography, 
Reverend Green explained that the proclamation’s undeniably Christian 
character was both intentional and obvious: 
To remove the complaint which I knew the religious community of our coun-
try had made, namely, that the proclamation[s] [of President Washington] call-
ing them to the duty of thanksgiving or fasting lacked a decidedly Christian 
spirit, I resolved to write one of an evangelical character which should not be 
liable to this objection, and to take the risk of its being objected or altered by 
the President.  This I accordingly did, and my draught was published with only 
the alteration of two or three words not at all affecting the religious character 
of my production.  The commendation bestowed on this proclamation by the 
pious people of our country was ardent and general.  It was of course supposed 
that the President had written it himself, and I said and did nothing to unde-
ceive them.  Indeed the sanction given it by the President made it virtually his 
own act.154 
As such, the reference to Christ in Adams’s first Thanksgiving Proclama-
tion of 1798 was not, as Justice Scalia alleges, a lone exception to an oth-
erwise pervasive practice.  To the contrary, the first twenty-five years of the 
Republic saw only four presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations (two by 
Washington and two by Adams),155 half of which were overtly Christian. 
Another early data point that Justice Scalia conspicuously did not men-
tion is the joint resolution of the First Congress that “after the oath [of of-
fice] shall have been administered to the President, he, attended by the 
Vice-President, and members of the Senate, and House of Representatives, 
                                                                                                                           
claiming that “[t]he two exceptions are the March 23, 1798 proclamation of John Adams, which asks 
God ‘freely to remit all our offenses’ ‘through the Redeemer of the World,’ and the November 17, 1972 
proclamation of Richard Nixon, which stated, ‘From Moses at the Red Sea to Jesus preparing to feed the 
multitudes, the Scriptures summon us to words and deeds of gratitude, even before divine blessings are 
fully perceived’” (citations omitted)). 
153  See John Adams, Thanksgiving Day Proclamation (Nov. 28, 1799), available at http://www. 
pilgrimhall.org/ThanxProc1789.htm. 
154  ASHBEL GREEN & JOSEPH H. JONES, THE LIFE OF ASHBEL GREEN 270–71 (1849); see also id. at 
554. 
155  See Pilgrim Hall Museum, Presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations 1789–1815, http://www. 
pilgrimhall.org/ThanxProc1789.htm (last visited Jan 28, 2006). 
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[shall] proceed to St. Paul’s Chapel, to hear divine service, to be performed 
by the chaplain of Congress.”156  In accordance with this resolution, George 
Washington walked to St. Paul’s with members of Congress immediately 
after being sworn in as President.157  At the ensuing church service, the Sen-
ate Chaplain read prayers from the Book of Common Prayer,158 an Episco-
palian prayer book that is composed exclusively of prayers to Jesus 
Christ.159  As one historian has explained, “[i]t is to be noted that this was 
not a service provided by an Episcopal church to which senators and repre-
sentatives were invited, but an official service carefully arranged for by 
both houses of Congress and conducted by their duly elected chaplain.”160 
Clearly, many of the official actions of the framing generation invoked 
and endorsed the Christian God, not just the biblical God.161  There is, ac-
cordingly, simply no rational way to derive Justice Scalia’s proposed rule 
from the historical sources on which he purports to rely.162 
The fact that Justice Scalia would preclude governmental endorsement 
of and favoritism toward Christianity should be at least somewhat comfort-
ing to those who value religious liberty and nonestablishment.  It appears 
that, while he may be at ease with the monotheistic majority using the gov-
ernment to acknowledge and pray as a people to a generic God, Justice 
Scalia is uncomfortable with the notion that the Constitution would allow 
the government to engage in blatant Christian religious expression and en-
dorsement, such as erecting a giant cross on the Capitol Building or placing 
Jesus Christ on the dollar bill.  But the problem for Justice Scalia is that he 
 
156  Epstein, supra note 151, at 2106–07; see also STOKES, supra note 151, at 485. 
157  See Epstein, supra note 151, at 2107. 
158  See id. 
159  See BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER (1789), available at http://justus.anglican.org/resources/bcp/ 
1789/BCP_1789.htm. 
160  STOKES, supra note 151, at 485. 
161  These actions of the early Presidents and Congresses—usually but not exclusively choosing to 
endorse God in general terms—are not entirely inconsistent with a rule that the government cannot en-
dorse controversial religious views, so long as we are willing to acknowledge the obvious truths that not 
all of the Framers were on the same page regarding the exact contours of the establishment principle, 
and that sometimes even the framing generation did not always scrupulously enforce the Constitution to 
its full extent.  After all, even when the government did engage in actions that supported Christianity 
alone, it still evinced a desire to be inclusive, at least among Christians.  Thus, when the Congress 
agreed to appoint chaplains, it provided that the House and Senate chaplains must be of different de-
nominations, and that the two chaplains must alternate weekly between the two houses of Congress.  See 
id. at 456. 
162  Indeed, if these sources do lead to the conclusion that the government need not be neutral be-
tween religions (so long as it is neutral between monotheistic sects), then why does that rule extend only 
to the government’s acknowledgment of the divine?  Why do these sources not establish a broader prin-
ciple of constitutionally preferred monotheism that undermines the mandate for neutrality among all 
religions in funding and other cases as well?  Justice Scalia points to no evidence from the framing era 
that shows that the Framers intended to treat acknowledgment cases differently from other cases.  Cf. 
Lupu, supra note 67, at 775–79 (arguing that the framing generation did not yet conceive of acknowl-
edgment cases as presenting establishment concerns).   
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claims to derive his rule (and, in particular, its crucial stopping point) solely 
from historical practices, yet the historical practices do not support the pro-
posed rule.  And at that point, he has nothing to fall back on—neither a co-
herent theoretical defense of his position, nor an underlying constitutional 
value or principle that his position can be said to serve.  He offers neither, 
because neither can be found.  When it is stripped of its faulty originalist 
dressing, his rule is exposed as nothing more than a personal vision of the 
proper relationship between church and state, untethered to text, history, 
theory, equality, or precedent. 
CONCLUSION 
To its champions, the chief benefit of an originalist mode of constitu-
tional interpretation is its ability to decide cases without reference to the 
personal policy preferences of the judges.163  An originalist judge can, the 
argument goes, determine constitutional meaning by looking to the objec-
tive historical record, rather than to his or her own subjective political val-
ues.  There are many scholars who argue that this benefit is illusory:  
because the historical sources invariably point in more than one direction, 
they fail to constrain judges from reaching their preferred political result.164  
That is to say, because there is no single, objective original meaning that 
can be discerned from the incomplete and often contradictory historical re-
cord, originalism pretends to an apolitical objectivity that it cannot de-
liver.165 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in McCreary County may well become Exhibit 
A in support of that conclusion.166  Justice Scalia claims, and I trust that he 
genuinely believes, that history compels the conclusion that the Establish-
ment Clause allows the government to prefer religion over nonreligion (but 
not vice versa) and to prefer Judeo-Christian religions over all other relig-
ions in the category of cases that is now at the forefront of the culture 
wars.167  This rule neatly mirrors the political agenda of the religious right.  
 
163  See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 7, 143–53 (1990); Antonin Scalia, 
Originalism:  The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863–64 (1989). 
164  See Smith, supra note 119, at 230. 
165  For an argument that this is particularly true with regard to Establishment Clause issues, see 
Frank Guliuzza III, The Practical Perils of an Original Intent-Based Judicial Philosophy:  Originalism 
and the Church-State Test Case, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 343 (1993).  See also Ravitch, supra note 54, at 
556–57. 
166  See, e.g., Posting of Jack M. Balkin to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/06/justice-
scalia-puts-his-cards-on-table.html (June 27, 2005, 12:53 EST). 
167  See David Cole, Faith and Funding:  Toward an Expressivist Model of the Establishment 
Clause, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 559, 584–85 (2002) (arguing that “Establishment Clause concerns are most 
acutely presented in modern America by official religious messages”); Jeffrey Gettleman, Alabama’s 
Top Judge Defiant on Commandments’ Display, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2003, at A1 (describing the ef-
forts of Alabama’s Judge Roy Moore and his supporters to preserve a Ten Commandments monument in 
the Alabama Supreme Court). 
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At the same time, Justice Scalia has concluded that history establishes that 
our Constitution does not prefer Christians over Jews, which benefits the 
Republican Party in its aggressive push to win the support of Jewish vot-
ers,168 or over Muslims, which benefits the President in his crucial attempts 
during the War on Terror to convince the Muslim world that the United 
States respects Islam and is not waging war against it.169  This interpretation 
of the Establishment Clause aligns almost perfectly with the political pref-
erences of the Republican Party, but it is both theoretically bankrupt and 
demonstrably not mandated by, nor even supported by, the multifaceted his-
torical evidence of the original meaning of the First Amendment on which 
it is ostensibly based.  The fact that Justice Scalia, surely one of the most in-
tellectually gifted judges of our time, and surely one of the most articulate, 
careful, and compelling champions of originalism ever to pick up a pen, has 
produced an opinion that mistakenly claims a historical mandate for what 
appears in reality to be a purely political conclusion raises serious questions 
about the promise of originalism as a workable, neutral constitutional the-
ory.   
Although Justice Scalia’s opinion has the potential to catalyze a revo-
lution in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, one hopes that the Court’s 
new Justices will recognize the flaws in Justice Scalia’s theory, and will 
stay the course in preserving constitutional protections for all religious mi-
norities. 
 
168  See Matthew E. Berger, Bush Names New Liaison to Jewish Community, JERUSALEM POST, June 
2, 2005, at 6 (noting “the Republican Party’s push to make inroads into the Jewish community”). 
169  See Editorial, World to the Wise, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 16, 2002, at A18 (“Ominously, the U.S. 
war on terrorism met opposition by majorities in virtually every Muslim society, even allies such as 
Turkey and Pakistan and even in countries outside the affected region such as Indonesia and Senegal.  
This suggests that, despite the Bush administration’s protestations to the contrary, much of the Muslim 
world still equates the war on terrorism with a war on Islam.  The United States must redouble actions 
that distinguish the two.”). 
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